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Abstract: This paper develops a dynamic microsimulation model with static ageing to 
assess the consequences of the assumptions and hypothesis of the Federal Planning 
Bureau on the prospective adequacy of pensions. A less technical and shorter version 
of this text was published as Gijs Dekkers, 2000, L‟évolution du pouvoir d‟achat des 
retraités: Une application du modèle de microsimulation STATION. in: Pestieau, P., 
L. Gevers, V. Ginsburgh, E. Schokkaert, B. Cantillon, Réflexions sur l’avenir de nos 
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Chapter 1. Introduction and problem formulation. 
 
1.1. Introduction. 
 
 As is the case in most western countries, the Belgian population is greying. As 
an illustration, consider the following figure, where the number of individuals over 60 
years old is expressed as a percentage of the population (source: World Bank, 1994, P. 
349). 
Figure 1: Percentage of population over 60 years old. 
percentage of population over 60 years old
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The percentage of retirees is relatively high in Belgium in 1990, but is growing 
somewhat slower than in the other countries, so that it ends up somewhere in the 
middle in 2050. So, the rate of ageing may be moderate if compared to countries such 
as the Netherlands and Italy, but it remains significant in itself. As could be expected, 
the consequences of such important population shifts have been explored thoroughly, 
not only its macroeconomic consequences, but (and probably even primarily) its 
consequences for the financial sustainability of public pension systems and health care 
services. (for instance, see World Bank, 1994, Creedy (ed.) 1995 and Bos (ed), 1993, 
Jackson, 1992, Jackson, 1998, Lesthaeghe, Meeusen, Vandewalle, 1998, Quinn, 
1997). As far as pensions are concerned, various empirical models have been 
developed with the aim of giving policy makers insight to the process of ageing and 
its consequences for the financial sustainability of pensions. (For instance, see, 
Huijzer and van Loo, 1986, Bolhuis and Vossers, 1986, Jansweijer, 1996 , van 
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Heerwaarden, Eikelboon, den Heijer, 1996, for the Netherlands, Bengtsson and Kruse, 
1993 for Sweden, De Callatay and Turtelboom, 1996, and (in a broader context) 
d‟Alcantara and Wardenier, 1997, Aaron, 1977, Kingsland, 1982). 
The model which has recently been developed at the Belgian Federal Planning 
Bureau (Festjens, 1997), referred to as PENSION, fits in this rich tradition. As is the 
cast in most of the above models, it disentangles several subgroups within the ageing 
population and shows what will happen to the contribution rates if the average 
pension benefits are kept constant, or vice versa. It is a model of the „flow or vintage 
type‟, where annual flows of 7 types of retirees (Festjens, idem, p. 6) are taken as a 
basis for a „mechanical‟ calculation of the pension benefits (Festjens, idem, p. 5). The 
author refer to the model PENSION as a submodule of the general model MALTESE 
(Festjens, idem, p.7), thereby emphasising the tight links between PENSION and the 
other models developed at the Bureau. An important characteristic of the model is that 
it does not extrapolate historical information, since this information can not be a 
reference for future generations of retirees (Festjens, idem, p.4 paragraph B). To a 
certain extent, this is certainly true: specific circumstances (such as the second World-
War or the economic heydays of the sixties) cause the socio-economic profile of 
generations to be different from other generations. However, it seems the most 
efficient to use all information available today, including historical information. 
Moreover, the model uses simulation results from macroeconomic models (HERMES 
and MALTESE) and demographic projections as input factors. These models combine 
historical information with scientific knowledge about identities and causal relations. 
Consequently, historical information does enter the pension models, though this link 
is indirectly. Lastly, and this is specific to the questions the model to be presented in 
this study tries to answer, the only information we have on the future distribution on 
income is the current distribution of income. Up to today, theory does not provide us 
with specific unambiguous empirical identities or causal relations which we can use to 
simulate the income distribution in a future point in time, without using the current 
distribution of income as a point of departure. We therefore have no choice but to use 
the historical information on the distribution of income. 
The simulation results of these kinds of vintage-like models as PENSION is, 
usually take the form of time-series, showing the simulated future development of, 
say, contribution rates and pension-benefits. This allows policy makers to see whether 
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or not ageing will become a (financing) problem in the future, and give them an idea 
on what actions they could take in order to preserve financial sustainability. Useful as 
these models are, they fail to show the redistributive impact of the pension system and 
the effect of ageing on this redistribution (and related variables, such as poverty). In 
other words, these models show what the policy makers can do to keep the pension 
system payable, if would they decide that action is required. But they do not show 
what the effect of these potential measures on the distribution of pension-benefits or 
the poverty rates among the retirees will be. It is however clear that when we consider 
the future welfare of the retirees, it is not enough only to look at the development of 
the average pension benefit. Other information, such as the distribution of 
(pension)income around the mean, poverty rates and such should be taken into 
account
1
.  
To overcome this lack of information concerning income distribution, 
microsimulation models have been developed. What microsimulation models exactly 
are will be explained in depth in the next paragraph, but let us just highlight the basic 
difference  with the models we just came to mention. This difference is that the point 
of departure of these models is the population (or subgroups within the population) as 
a whole, where the point of departure of microsimulation models is the individual 
itself.  
 In this study, the effect of ageing on pension income inequality, poverty and  
welfare of the retirees will be considered. It this respect, the model which forms the 
basis of this study, the microsimulation model STATION, can be seen as being  
complementary to the PENSION-model of the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau, since 
it uses some of the assumptions of  this model to show the consequences on the 
poverty rates,  income distribution and future development of welfare of the retirees. 
So, this study concentrates on what effect potential policy measures (or the not-taking 
of these policy measures) will have on the future income distribution, poverty and 
welfare development of the retirees. The „income-side‟ of the pension system is under 
consideration only to the extent that it is strictly necessary, so for questions as „will 
                                                          
1
 Barry (1990, p.2) describes the link between welfare and (redistributional) justice as „inextricably‟.  
Note that using income as a notion of household welfare is subject to criticism (see Slesnick, 1998), for 
instance because this assumes constant marginal utility of money and because price-changes are 
ignored. 
 8 
the pension system remain payable in the future‟, the reader is referred to other 
literature, notably Festjens, 1997, and de Callatay et. al, 1996. 
The above discussion can be summarised in the following problem definition: 
what is the effect of ageing on the development of pension-benefits, the inequality of 
pension-benefits and poverty and how will these circumstances change as a result of 
some assumptions and policy measures used in the PENSION-model by the Federal 
Planning Bureau?  
This study starts by a brief discussion of the Belgian pension system. Next, we 
will turn our attention to microsimulation models: what is microsimulation? What 
kind of techniques are associated with microsimulation and what are their advantages 
and disadvantages? As a third step, the static microsimulation model STATION will 
be explained in depth and the fourth step will then be the presentation and discussion 
of the simulation results. Finally, conclusions will be drawn. 
 Before proceeding, a last introductory remark must be made. In order to 
facilitate co-operation with researchers from other universities, an internet-homepage 
has been made. The address of this STATION-homepage is 
http://www.ufsia.ac.be/~gdekkers/station/index.htm. This homepage offers those who 
know the required passwords the possibility to download the simulation results (i.e. 
the weighting variables), which can then be used in other empirical studies. Of course, 
a more extensive technical description of how to use the simulation results, is 
provided as well. 
 
1.2. A birds-eye view on the Belgian pension system. 
 
 The Belgian pension system consists of three layers of which the first one is 
the most important. The first layer consists of three separate state-wide pension 
systems for employees, civil servants and self-employed. The benefits paid out to 
retirees in a certain year are financed by contributions of the working generations (a 
system widely known as a Pay-As-You-go System or PAYG), though the government 
contributes heavily as well
2
. For all three systems, the pension benefit is equal to 60 or 
                                                          
2
 For instance,  in 1985, the (expected) contributions of the state covered 19.8% of total pension 
benefits paid out to former employees. For the self-employed and the civil-servants, these percentages 
were 32.3% and 71.2%, respectively (de Cock, 1984, page 56). 
 9 
75%
3
 of a certain wage base, times the relative length of the career (expressed in 45
th
 
for males and 40
th
 for females, though this latter figure is now gradually being 
adjusted). The wage-base is either the career-long average wage (or profit) for 
employees and self-employed, or the average wage of only the last five years of the 
career for civil servants. Given a certain minimal length of career, the system provides 
a minimum pension benefit.  
These separate pension schemes for employees, self-employed and civil servants are 
supplemented by a system of „guaranteed income for retirees‟, a welfare-scheme 
providing those retirees who never had a career or a career of insufficient length with 
a minimal and means-tested pension benefit.  
 The second layer of the Belgian pension system consists of semi-collective 
additional pension schemes, organized on the firm level by pension funds. Though 
this second layer is rapidly gaining importance, the relative number of pension-
receiving households is still rather limited (see Dekkers, 1998, table 2 and Neyt, 1993, 
p. 362). The third level consists of individual pension schemes and life-insurances. 
These last two pension benefits are voluntary, based on capital funding instead of  
Pay-As-You-Go and are complementary to the nation-wide first-layer pension system. 
The microsimulation model STATION, which is the raison d’être of this text, 
concentrates on the first layer of the Belgian pension system. 
  
1.3. Demographic trends in Belgium 
 
 Next, let us glance at the demographical situation of Belgium for a moment. 
This paragraph, which draws heavily on chapters 2 and 3 of the book by Lesthaege, 
Meeusen and Vandewalle (idem, 1998), will briefly discuss both past and expected-
future demographic trends in Belgium. 
 The recent „demographic history‟ of Belgium is characterized by two 
important demographic transitions, of which the second is the most relevant in this 
context. The first demographic transition took place in the nineteenth century and 
started with a decrease of the mortality rate (as a result of medical improvements and 
increasing knowledge on hygiene). This was followed by a decrease of the fertility 
                                                          
3
 The latter is the family pension benefit, of which only one of the marital partners is eligible, i.e. given 
that the other partner refrains from his or her individual pension claim. 
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rate, resulting from urbanisation and secularisation. Moreover,  the average age of 
marriage started to decrease, and the relative number of celibate individuals rose.  
 The second demographic roughly started in the second half  of the fifties. This 
transition was triggered by changing social values, among other things on the role of 
the family in society and the emancipation of women. During the first half of the 
sixties, and probably partially resulting from the fact that economic growth rates were 
very high, the average age of marriage decreased even further, and so did the average 
number  of years between marriage and having the first child. Consequently, fertility 
reached a maximum, resulting in the so-called „baby-boom‟. However, mainly as a 
result from the introduction of the contraceptive pill, combined with increasing 
economic independence of women (and therefore higher „opportunity costs‟ of 
maternity), the fertility rate again decreased rapidly. This effect was strengthened by a 
delay of marriage and parentage. As a result, a „baby-bust‟ started in the second half 
of the seventies and continued during the eighties. The fertility rate was 2.25 in 1970, 
which is above replacement-rate, but then decreased to 1.69 in 1980 and 1.55 in 1996 
and 1996 (idem, 1998, table 2.6, p. 40).  
Demographic behavioural changes like the ones described hitherto change 
demographic structures and the effects of this are of  a typical long-term nature. These 
changes therefore form a basis for projections of the future. Additionally, assumptions 
on the future course of some key variables make it possible to distinguish simulation 
variants. In this text, only one variant will be discussed, since it forms the basis of the 
simulations of the Federal Planning Bureau and, consequently, our own simulations
4
. 
The key assumptions underlying the projections of scenario A of the National Institute 
of Statistics and the Federal Planning Bureau are, first of all, that the life expectancy 
at birth (which is now 80 years for men and women taken together) will increase to 
82.1 for males and 88.1 for females. Secondly, the migration balance (which has a 
positive balance of 10,000 immigrants  per year in 1995) will decrease to 3,000 in 
2050. Thirdly, fertility increases rapidly from 1,55 in 1995 to 1.75 in 2010 and 
remains stable thereafter. 
                                                          
4
 This is variant A. This variant, together with the other variants, is discussed in Lesthaeghe et. al., 
1998, p. 62 and further. 
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It must however be noted that Lesthaeghe et. al. think that the assumed future 
recovery of the fertility rate is too high,  and that the decrease of the proportion of 
individuals younger than 20 is therefore underestimated.  
 The described historical developments, together with the assumptions, result in 
some main demographic trends. First of all, the rate of ageing will be quite strong 
between 2010 and 2030. It will not only be caused by an increase of the proportion of 
retirees („greying‟), but by a decrease of the proportion of young individuals as well. 
Thirdly, immigration can prevent the population to decrease from a certain point on, 
but its negative effect on ageing will be small, if any. 
 Of course, the changes in demographic behaviour as mentioned above, have 
their consequences for the household structure in Belgium. Based on projections  by 
Boulanger et. al. (idem, up to 2011), the following trends for four broad age-
categories can be mentioned. As far as children and young individuals up to 20 years 
of age are considered, the most important trend is that the proportion of children 
living in households where there is only one parent, or where parents cohabit, will 
increase. Young adults (between 20 and 34) will tend to remain living with their 
parents more often. Moreover, the proportion of married individuals,  especially with 
children, in this age-category will decrease. From the beginning of the eighties on, the 
proportion of young adults living alone has been increasing. This trend will persist, 
though at a lower speed as more and more individuals will cohabit.  
 For older adults (say between 40 and 65), the trend that the proportion of 
married parents decreases, emerges as well. This effect is however less strong for 
individuals of 55 and older, since more young adults postpone forming their own 
household and remain living with their parents. As a result of  an increasing 
probability of divorce, the proportion of older adults who live alone, increases.  
Lastly, the trends for the retirees must be described. Two main trends emerge: 
first of all, the life expectancy of couples increases strongly, so the average age of 
losing ones partner increases as well. Secondly, the proportion of retirees living with 
relatives will decrease, as will be the case with the proportion of retirees living in 
institutions.  
 Here ends the description of the demographic situation of Belgium, now and in 
the future. Next, the question what microsimulation is and what can be done with it, 
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will be answered. The following step will then be the presentation and description of 
the microsimulation model STATION and its simulation results. 
 
1.4. What is microsimulation? 
 
Socio-economic models can be subdivided according to the level on which 
they apply. First of all, there are macroeconomic models. These models simulate 
entire countries or even groups of countries. Secondly, there are meso-economic 
models which concentrate on the simulation of one or more branches of industry 
within a country. The third category of socio-economic models has emerged the most 
recently and take (groups of) individuals as the point of departure. The models in this 
category are called microsimulation models and aim at evaluating the effect of various 
economic- and social changes on the distribution of certain characteristics for different 
groups of individuals. Mostly , the goal of microsimulation models is to analyse the 
changes in the poverty rates and the distribution of income over groups in the 
population, resulting from external changes, such as demographic changes, economic 
development and policy changes. 
 The way which microsimulation models work can best be explained by 
rephrasing it to a problem common in econometrics and sociometrics, namely that of 
missing data analysis. Suppose we have a cross-sectional dataset at time t, consisting 
of n variables describing i individuals. Suppose furthermore a dataset of n variables 
and j individuals at the future time point t+z, z>0, which can be considered as 
consisting completely of missings, as shown in figure 2: 
Figure 2: future data is missing... 
 
Now microsimulation models basically are tools to fill in the missing datasets 
at the future time point t+1 up to t+z. Standard textbook econometrics learns us that 
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missings can be filled in by two general methods: cold-deck imputation and hot-deck 
imputation (for an introduction to these techniques, see Kalton, 1983). These two 
methods form the basis of the division of microsimulation models in static
5
 - and 
dynamic microsimulation models. Both types will be discussed briefly below. 
 
1.4.1.  Dynamic microsimulation. 
 
Dynamic microsimulation basically fills in the missing datasets by using hot-
deck imputation. Taking the cross-sectional dataset in time t as the point of departure, 
every individual in this dataset faces certain probabilities of a change in each of the n 
variables which describe him or her. Whether or not the value of one descriptive 
variable actually changes is determined by a Monte-Carlo process. Let us consider a 
stylised example: consider an individual of a certain age. Given this age, he or she 
faces a certain risk of mortality denoted by d. Now for our individual, a random 
number between 0 and 1 is drawn from an uniform distribution. If the resulting 
number is below the mortality risk d (which can in turn be a function of other 
variables) then the individual is considered dead at t+1. If not, he remains alive, with 
the result that his age is increased with one. Likewise, our living individual faces a 
certain probability (technically speaking) of becoming married, having a child, finding 
or losing a job, and so forth. The number of variables which can be altered between 
subsequent points in time depends entirely on how much information on transition 
probabilities is available to the constructor of the model.  
With dynamic microsimulation, the life history as well as earnings history of 
individuals belonging to different groups within the sample can be simulated. The 
modeller has relative freedom in what to add to the model. An important  advantage is 
that it is possible to define individual stock-variables, adding up past values of the 
flow-type. For instance, the lifetime-income of an individual can be kept track of by 
adding up past (discounted) annual values of income over the whole lifetime of the 
individual. As a result, the effect of socio-economic policy measures can be expressed 
                                                          
5
 Indeed, this distinction between „static‟ and „dynamic‟ microsimulation models is somewhat 
confusing, since both types of models are dynamic in the sense that they are time-dependent. So, a 
formally better (but less appealing) description could have been „statically time-dependent‟ and 
„dynamically time-dependent‟. The reader should keep in mind that both static - and dynamic 
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in terms of „lifetime-income‟ instead of annual income of various groups and 
generations of individuals, since the latter can be expected to be biased in the sense 
that the redistributive effect of a certain measure is generally overestimated when 
expressed in terms of annual income. (Nelissen, 1995, and Harding, 1993). As will 
become clear when discussing static microsimulation models, this is one of the more 
important advantages of dynamic- over static microsimulation models. However, 
dynamic microsimulation models have disadvantages too: first of all, they are 
generally very large in terms of source code, they usually are very complex and take a 
long time to develop. As a result the costs of maintenance are high,  and it takes quite 
some time to introduce new researchers to the technical details of the model. 
Moreover, their use and  trustworthiness is restricted to the availability of trustworthy 
transition data. Lastly, dynamic microsimulation models make extensive use of 
computer recourses,  though this is becoming less important due to the rapid 
development of computers.  Moreover, as opposed to static models, dynamic 
microsimulation models do not allow the immediate jump from today to -say- 2020 
without having to simulate all the intermediate years.  An application of dynamic 
microsimulation on the pension system in the Netherlands is Dekkers et. al, 1995. 
 
1.4.2. Static Microsimulation. 
 
In her 1993-book on microsimulation, Harding (Harding, 1993, p.19, see also 
Harding, 1996, p.3) describes two key techniques involved in the static ageing of a 
dataset. The first one is to reweigh the sample, whereas the second key technique is 
referred to as uprating. Both techniques are used in STATION, the static model under 
consideration here. However, as it is the most fundamental technique of the two - and 
very typical for static microsimulation models, this section will concentrate on the 
first key technique: the reweighting of the dataset. 
As said in paragraph 1.3, the reweighting-technique of static microsimulation 
is basically cold-deck imputation of missing variables. The vast majority of cross-
sectional datasets contain a weighting variable which gives the individual more or less 
importance (i.e. a greater or smaller weight) in the sample in order to make the sample 
                                                                                                                                                                      
microsimulation models include a notion of „time‟, being reflected in changing (demographic) 
circumstances. 
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more representative for the whole population, for instance by neutralising the effect of 
selective nonresponse. The technique of static microsimulation boils down to 
adjusting these individual weights to let the dataset in the base year t meet 
descriptions of the future population, which are exogenous from the point of view of 
the model. 
Suppose for instance that a 1992-dataset consists of a certain percentage of 
female individuals aged between 15 and 19 and suppose that we know from 
demographic projections that this proportion will decrease by 8.5% between 1992 and 
2020. Then the „2020-proportion‟ of women can be formed by multiplying the weight 
variable of the women in this age group by (1-0.085)=0.915. Note that the weight 
factors of other categories must be adjusted upwards to neutralise the effect of this 
decreasing proportion of young women on the weighted size of the dataset as a whole.  
 The basic difference between static and dynamic microsimulation models is 
that the actual individual data remain unchanged in the case of static microsimulation 
modelling; only the weight factor is altered corresponding to the future situation. In 
dynamic models, by contrast, the weight variable remains unchanged but the actual 
individual information is changed according to individual transition risks and using a 
Monte-Carlo process. In reality, however, the difference is often less clear, since both 
techniques can be used in the same model. 
 The disadvantages of dynamic models are the advantages of static 
microsimulation models: the latter are technically simple (relative to dynamic models, 
that is), though less intuitive and less CPU-demanding
6
 than dynamic models. This 
efficiency is increased further by the fact that, one can form the „2020-dataset‟ in one 
step, without having to simulate all the intermediate years first. Moreover, one can use 
the simulation results in other empirical research without having any technical 
knowledge on the model itself. In the case of STATION, the simulated weight-
transformators can be downloaded from the homepage. 
A drawback of static models is its lack of flexibility, compared to dynamic 
microsimulation models. Moreover -and this is probably the most serious drawback of 
static microsimulation models- the fact that simulation periods in time can be skipped 
reveals that the model does not have a „memory‟. To make this more clear, let us 
                                                          
6
 Of course, that is a relative notion: on a 100 mhz. Pentium with just 32 mb. RAM, running all the 
modules of STATION for all years between 1992 and 2050 takes at least three days and four nights. 
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return to the example of how to calculate the lifetime income (i.e. the income which 
an individual earns over his or hers whole life) in a dynamic microsimulation model, 
and consider whether or not this could also be done in a static microsimulation model. 
In order to construct the lifetime income of an individual, the annual income of this 
individual in each year of his or her  life is added up. So, a new variable is created 
when an individual is born and increased each year, until the individual deceases . Is 
this possible in a static model? No, simply because the individual does not get born, 
gets older and deceases in a static model. The individual data remains unchanged: 
only the weights change. Moreover -again as opposed to dynamic microsimulation- 
the simulation results for a certain year x do not influence the simulation results of  
another year y, since these simulation results are both directly calculated from the 
base-data set. Consequently, the adding up of annual income -even if it would be 
meaningful- is not possible. 
 This discussion of the drawbacks of static microsimulation models ends the 
first part of this text. In this part, an introductory overview of microsimulation and the 
two types of microsimulation models was given. Both static and dynamic 
microsimulation models have their advantages and disadvantages, which are to a 
certain extent mutually exclusive. In the second part of the text, which now follows, 
the static microsimulation model STATION, developed by the author at the Centre for 
Social Policy (Centrum voor Sociaal Beleid or CSB) of Antwerp University (UFSIA), 
will be presented and discussed.  
 
Chapter 2. Antwerp STATION. 
 
When the need for a microsimulation model emerged, there was consensus 
among the CSB-researchers that this model should meet a number of demands, of 
which a short development period was not the least important one. Another thing was 
that there was doubt about the availability of enough transition data for a dynamic 
model. Moreover, a crucial demand was that the model should make it possible to be 
linked to other models of the  CSB. 
For these and other reasons, it was decided to build a static microsimulation 
model, named STATION (from STAtic microsimulaTION, indeed: the name of the 
model is also inspired by the fact that the author spends several hours in the train 
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every day to commute between home and work). STATION describes the future 
development of the Belgian population starting in 1992 and allowing simulation of 
every year up to 2050. It aims at analysing the effects of demographic change (notably 
greying) on the Belgian social security system, and it is designed to be a 
complementary part of MISIM, the microsimulation model describing the Belgian 
social security- and tax-system, developed at the Centre for Social Policy. This  model 
MISIM (MIcroSImulatieModel) is a static microsimulation model for direct taxes and 
benefits
7
. The relation between MISIM and STATION is best described by quoting 
Merz: „Static microsimulation naturally is connected with the time period of the 
cross-section data [which, in the case of MISIM is 1992, G.D.] Temporal 
extrapolation to actualize the data or to forecast the sample into the future, called 
ageing of the sample, however, is available in more recent static [microsimulation 
models, G.D.]‟ (Merz, 1994, p.6). It is this last sentence which describes the role of 
STATION. 
The model STATION is written in SAS and consists of one general program 
and various submodules, which take the form of SAS-macros, generally with the 
projection-year as the only argument. The first submodule modifies the age- and 
gender structure of the 1992-dataset. The second submodule changes the distribution 
of the family-type to the future situation. This body of the model is completed by a 
number of SAS-macros, one of which deals with the intrapolation of the exogenous 
projection data. Other macros upgrade variables which reflecting economic growth, 
indexation and such. Moreover, additional and separate macros derive a number of 
dependent informative variables, such as poverty rates, income inequalities and so 
forth.  
The model STATION transforms weight variables, which are then applied to 
the 1992-wave of the Socio-Economic Panel of the Centre for Social Policy. The SEP-
panel data set started in 1985 and continued in 1988, 1992 and recently 1997. The 
1992-wave of the SEP consists of 3821 households, of which 2285 are Flemish and 
1177 are Walloon (Cantillon,  et. al., 1993, p.7). Due to its size and as a result of 
weighting techniques, aiming to correct for selective attrition and non-response, the 
panel can be considered representative for the population (idem, p.7 and Proost, et.al., 
                                                          
7
 Verbist, et. al., 1999, for an application of MISIM see, for instance, De Lathouwer L., in: Harding  
(ed.), 1996, Amsterdam, Elsevier, p. 69-91. 
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1996). So, every household in the dataset has an accompanying weighting variable. 
The dataset consists of a number of individual- and household characteristics. 
Monthly available income (of which the most important are net labour income and 
various sources of social security income) is gathered on the household level as well 
as on the individual level. Moreover, some household-specific income sources (such 
as housing grants) are also asked for. Lastly, and less relevant in this study, there is an 
extensive list of individual‟s consumption pattern, their attitude towards their income, 
and so forth. 
The simulation results of the core modules of the model STATION are 
basically growth rates, which can be used to transform the household population 
weighting variable of the Socio-Economic Panel. These latter results will be presented 
in the third chapter of this study. The transformation of sample weights can be done 
on the individual - or the household level. For any future year between 1992 and 2050, 
the model generates a list containing the following variables for every individual. 
1. INDnum: an unique number for every individual in the 1992-dataset. 
2. LIPRO: family-classification of individual INDnum. 
3. weegL: individual transformation according to the future age-distribution 
(module 1). 
4. weegG: individual transformation according to the future LIPRO-
distribution (module 2). 
For every future year and for every individual in the 1992-dataset, the two 
transformation variables are generated by the model.  
How can these simulation results be used? Suppose  for instance that one 
wants to see how the income distribution of a certain subset of the Socio-Economic 
Panel changes between 1992 and, say, 2030. Or -which is possible as well- suppose 
that one wants to know how the estimation results of a certain behavioural relation 
change between 1992 and 2030. How can this be done? First of all, one derives the 
unique individual identification number INDnum out of other variables in the SEP-
dataset
8
. Next, the above-mentioned list of transformation variables for the year 2030 
must be combined with the SEP-dataset, using INDnum as the merging-variable. 
Thirdly, the household-weighting factor must be multiplied with one (or more) of the 
                                                          
8
 To see how this is done exactly, see the internet-homepage. One however needs the passwords for 
this. 
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transformation variables, depending on whether the variable is on the individual- or 
household level. The resulting dataset is the 1992-dataset, but then transformed to 
2030 which can then be used to answer the questions stated above. If one wants to -as 
will be done in this study- one can uprate any monetary variable in the weighted 
dataset, using whatever assumptions one wants, provided that one does not want to 
use individual stock-variables, as explained earlier. In the presentation of the 
simulation results in paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2, uprating will be ignored, since the effect 
of reweighting will be shown by looking at some key demographic variables. In 
paragraph 2.3, the upgrading technique will be discussed in depth. The third chapter 
will entirely be devoted to the presentation and discussion of simulation results which 
combine reweighting and upgrading.  
Before considering the model as well as the simulation results which stem 
from the weight-transformation process and upgrading, a final note must be made on 
the simulation years for simulation results will be presented further in this study: even 
though this will only be presented for the years 1995, 2000, 2005 and so forth, up to 
2050, the model is capable to simulate all in-between years as well.  
 Next , the two modules which form STATION will be discussed in more 
depth. To see their effect on the data, figures describing the situation in the original 
dataset of 1992 will be compared to simulation results for the years 1995, 2000, 2005 
and up to 2050. These simulation results will only be the result of the transformation 
of individual sample weights in the dataset and corresponding changes in income 
variables will therefore not be presented yet, since they lack realism. 
 
2.1. The first key technique: reweighting to incorporate ageing. 
 
The first submodule adjusts the age-gender structure of the 1992-dataset to the 
combined age-gender projections provided by the Belgian National Institute for 
Statistics and the Federal Planning Bureau (source: basic scenario of the 
Bevolkingsvooruitzichten 1992-2050). These projections show the future proportion of 
every age group - and gender combination in the dataset, relative to the 1992-
proportions. The projections range from 1995 up to 2050 with five-year jumps (e.g. 
1995, 2000, 2005, 2010...) and are indices with 1992 as the base year (or equal to 
100). However, in order to make the model able to simulate to intermediate years as 
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well, these projections were intrapolated. Thus, the first submodule ables us to modify 
the age-gender structure of the 1992 dataset to every future year between 1995 and 
2050. This modification is done by simply multiplying the weight factors with the 
corresponding future indexes.  
 As the Belgian population ages, one of the general effects of this first module 
is that the weighting factor of older individuals increases ceteris paribus, whereas the 
weighting factor of younger individuals decreases, as could be expected. This can be 
seen by looking at figure 3. 
 Figure 3: Age-distribution. 
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Ageing is caused by two independent effects. First of all, if a cohort is much larger 
than the succeeding cohorts, this cohort will have a disproportional influence on the 
age-structure of the entire population. This is sometimes compared with a piglet 
swallowed by a snake (Becker, 1994, p.212, Lesthaeghe et. al, 1998, p. 61). After 
being swallowed, the piglet is pushed through the snake, while slowly being digested. 
Analogous to this, the babyboom-cohort moves right along the horizontal axis, while 
its size decreases as a result of mortality. The second -and probably more important- 
cause of the ageing of the population is the extension of the life-expectancy, resulting 
from technological, medical and economical development. The effect of the longer 
life-expectancy is reflected by the decrease of the size of the cohorts, or the speed of 
digestion of the piglet by the snake. This effect does not come forward from the above 
graph very clearly, but it can still be seen that the difference in the size of the „bump‟ 
decreases harder between 1992 and 2020 than between 2020  and 2050. Thus, as time 
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goes by, the negative effect of the mortality rate on the size of the bump decreases, 
showing the effect of decreasing mortality rates.  
 It could seem from figure 3 that there is virtually no difference between the 
proportions of the oldest age-groups at the three points in time. Concluding that the 
relative size of these oldest groups does not change would be erroneous, since this 
change is surpressed by the scale of the y-axis. Figure 4 shows the average growth rate 
of the proportions of the age-gender groups over the whole projection period. Here, 
the scaling effect is neutralised and the important effect of ageing on the relative sizes 
of the oldest age-groups is easily seen. 
 
Figure 4: Average growth rate of the age-gender proportions. 
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Figure 4 clearly depicts that, as a result of ageing, the size of the older age-groups will 
increase (especially the very-old), whereas the relative size of the younger cohorts 
decreases. The turning point lies around the age of 45.  
 
2.2. The first key technique: reweighting to incorporate changing family structures. 
 
 In the second submodule, the family structure of the 1992- dataset is altered to 
meet family structure projections based on the „realistic scenario‟ of Boulanger, P., A. 
Lambert, P. Deboosere and R. Lesthaeghe (la Formation des Familles: étude 
Prospective), of which the projection period is from 1996 to 2011
9
. Before proceeding 
                                                          
9
 As the entire projection period goes to 2050, for the simulation years after 2011, the household-
transformation rates are based on the 2011-proportions. The implicit assumption is therefore that the 
family-structure given the age-structure does not change after 2011 anymore. Of course, this does not 
prevent the family-structure to change  in the sample after 2011, but that would be due to a changing 
age-structure. 
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with the explanation of this module, it is important to realise that the distribution by 
the family-type LIPRO changes due to the individual ageing as described in paragraph 
2.1. as well. For instance, as more older individuals live alone, the number of one-
person households can be expected to increase. From Boulanger et.al., we know what 
percentage of the future population will be in what LIPRO-classification, given their 
age and gender. The model compares the percentage of the „age-gender modified‟ 
sample with these projected proportions, and transforms the individual weighting 
factors to meet these proportions. Consequently, changes in the distribution of family-
type which are independent of the age-gender distribution are imposed on the data. In 
other words, this second modules changes the distribution by LIPRO given the 
distribution of age and gender. 
 First of all, we need to know the different types of family which are 
distinguished. This classification is known as the LIPRO-classification and  consists 
of the following entries: 
 
1. Child of a married couple. 
2. Child of an unmarried couple. 
3. Child of an one-parent family. 
4. Single. 
5. Married individual without children. 
6. Married individual with children. 
7. Cohabiting individual without children. 
8. Cohabiting individual with children. 
9. Head of an one-parent family. 
10. Living in the same house as 4, 5 or 6. 
11.Others. 
 
 The last category (others) a.o. contains individuals living in nursery homes, 
psychiatric institutions and other (nonvoluntary) collective forms of cohabitation. 
However, these individuals do not occur in the 1992-dataset, so a direct comparison to 
the proportions in this dataset with the Boulanger-projections is not possible. To 
overcome this problem, the projected proportions have been recalculated, excluding 
this last category. Using the above proportions and the projected numbers of 
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individuals in every age-gender-category, the projected numbers of individuals in each 
age-gender and family-type were derived. Next, the numbers of individuals in the last 
category („others‟) were excluded from the dataset, and the proportions were 
calculated again.  
In the following figures, the numbers of individuals in a certain family-
category are represented as a fraction of the total number of individuals in that same 
age-category. In other words, these figures representing the probability that an 
individual is to be observed in a certain family-type, given that he or she is in a 
certain age-category. Taking the percentages to the total numbers of individuals in 
every age group largely neutralises the effect of ageing, since the first module 
transforms the weighting factors for age-groups as a whole. This means that in the 
following figures, the changes are mostly due to changing family-type distributions, 
and (to a large extend) disregard ageing.  
 
Figure 5 & 6: LIPRO-classification, % age group. 
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Figure 7 & 8: LIPRO-classification, % age group. 
0
20
40
60
80
LIPRO
p
e
rc
e
n
t
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1992
2020
2050
LIPRO: 30<=age<40
1992-2020-2050
0
20
40
60
80
LIPRO
p
e
rc
e
n
t
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1992
2020
2050
LIPRO: 40<=age<50
1992-2020-2050
 
Figure 9 & 10: LIPRO-classification, % age group. 
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Remember that the horizontal axis consists of the household-types, of which 
the entries are given on page 20. In figure 5, it seems hardly surprising that the vast 
majority of the individuals younger than 20 are children of married couples (1), as this 
is the most traditional family-form. It is not very surprising either that the importance 
of this group is decreasing over time, a decrease which primary occurs in the first half 
of the simulation period. It is quite interesting to see that the relative number of 
children living in one-parent families (3) is higher than children from unmarried 
couples (2). The importance of both categories increases as the relative size of 
category 1 decreases. Again, this increase is the most important between 1992 and 
2020. 
 For the group of individuals between 20 and 30, as shown in figure 6, the most 
striking is that -even though the relative sizes of individuals in other categories have 
increased relative to figure 5, the majority of the individuals in that age group still live 
with both their parents (1). Note that the relative number of individuals being a child 
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of an unmarried couple (2) has decreased even relative to the relative number of 
individuals being a child in an one-parent family (3), who has decreased as well. A bit 
over 10% of the individuals between 20 and 30 are single, a percentage which is lower 
than the relative number of individuals which are married with -or without children (6 
and 5). Especially the group of individuals belonging to the 6
th
 category (married with 
children) is quite large. The relative sizes of the remaining categories are rather low, 
where it is noticeable that the group cohabiting individuals without children (7) is 
larger than the group cohabiting individuals with children (8): apparently, the event of 
getting children seems to be a motive for marriage.  
When we look at the intertemporal shifts in figure 6, we see that the relative 
number of children in two-parent families and married individuals decrease, whereas 
the relative number of cohabiting individuals increase and so does  the relative 
number of children in one-parent families. 
 The relative number of married individuals without children (5) decreases 
between figures 6 and 7 (individuals between 20 and 30 years of age and between 30 
and 40 years of age), but remains fairly constant between figures 7 and 8 (individuals 
between 40 and 50 years of age). Meanwhile, the relative number of singles (4) 
increases somewhat at first, but then remains constant.   
 The pattern of the increasing importance of the group of married individuals 
which children, continues for individuals between 50 and 60 years of age. However, 
for the individuals over 60, a reverse shift can be seen: as children move out of the 
house and as the mortality rate increases, the relative numbers of married individuals 
without children and singles increases whereas the relative number of married 
individuals with children drops significantly between figures 9 and 10.  
 
2.3. the second key technique: uprating. 
 
2.3.1. Introduction and assumptions. 
 
 As said, Harding (Harding, 1993, p.19) sees reweighting as one key technique 
involved in the static ageing of a dataset. It is certainly the technique which 
disentangles this type of models from other models, which are often time-series 
models. The basis of STATION is formed by this reweighting. The second key 
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technique is uprating, where attempts are made to adjust monetary values to account 
for movements since the time of the survey or future anticipated movements (idem). 
This second technique will allow us to distinguish various simulation-variants.  
Up to now, we implicitly assumed that the nominal wages or social-security 
benefits do not change over time. In other words, the macroeconomic world was 
implicitly assumed to be „frozen‟ in 1992; only the population was altered. This is a 
very unrealistic assumption, of course. Not only do productivity changes cause wage 
changes, but pensions in Belgium are linked to the rate of inflation which means that 
they increase as well (though generally at a lower rate than the wages). Moreover, the 
level upon which the wages set the (future) pension benefits, is subject to change as 
well. So, in order to make the model more realistic, this reweighted dataset must be 
supplemented with assumptions about the macroeconomic context. But what is the 
relevant macroeconomic context and how will it change in the future? Before turning 
to the actual discussion of how the monetary values were uprated, let us first consider 
briefly the macroeconomic assumptions underlying this uprating process. In order to 
keep things simple and workable, we only take the real development of wages and 
social security benefits as the exogenous time-variables. Thus, we require assumptions 
on the future macroeconomic development of real wages and of the indexation 
process. The course of the pension incomes is legally linked to the rate of inflation 
and therefore does not follow the (real) wage growth. Moreover, as the model is in 
real terms, the requirement that the pensions are linked to the price-index in this 
context means that they remain constant over time, whereas wages show a certain 
annual increase. As the projections of the Federal Planning Bureau of Belgium form 
the scientific point of departure of this study, let us remain as close as possible to the 
assumptions made in this study. This point of departure is an assumed real wage-
increase of 2.25% per year (see Festjens, 1997, page 26) which is based on the 
average adjustments in the period 1969-1991 (idem, p. 82). So, as a base-rate 
simulation or first scenario, we should consider the distributional effects - and the 
relative income of the retirees given a constant real pension income and a real wage 
growth of 2.25% per year. This first scenario reflects what is expect to happen if no 
additional policy measures will be taken, i.e. if the current situation will persist. A 
second scenario or - simulation variant concerns introducing another assumption of 
the Federal Planning Bureau, namely a limited linkage of the pension benefit to the 
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real course of wages. More specifically, we consider a annual increase of the pension 
benefit of 1%, given the 2.25% wage growth per year (see Festjens, 1997, page 33). 
This assumption is claimed not to be pessimistic, and for the real growth rate of 
wages, we most certainly agree, not to mention that it could even be considered 
somewhat optimistic. However, the distributional effect of the partial linkage of 
(pension) benefits to the course of wages remains un- or underexplored in the study of 
the Federal Planning Bureau. The third scenario or - simulation variant, a so-called 
„wage-barrier‟ will be introduced. The purpose of this barrier is to limit the limit the 
pension benefit of all non-civil servants to a certain maximum, and -which is more 
relevant in the context of our model- to limit the effect of wage-increases on (future) 
pension benefit for those who are not civil servants
10
 and who earn more than the 
wage-barrier. Again, following the assumptions of the Federal  Planning Bureau, it 
will be assumed that this wage-barrier has a real growth rate of 1%, starting in 1997
11
 
(see Festjens, 1997, page 32). Lastly, the fourth scenario or - simulation variant 
will simultaneously introduce the partial linkage between pensions and wages, and the 
wage-barrier. 
 
2.3.2. The link between wages and pensions. 
 
Having described the various scenarios to be dealt with, let us describe these in 
more detail, since understanding of what is happening is crucial for the  understanding 
of the simulation results. First of all, let us concentrate on the first scenario. The 
question therefore is: what is the effect of the assumptions of no linkage between the 
wage-rate and the pension benefit on the distribution of income, the income-inequality 
and the poverty among the retirees, given an assumed wage-growth rate of 2.25% and 
the demographic changes described in the earlier chapters? To answer this question, 
the first thing we have to know is how this process of linking the incomes of the 
retirees to those of the non-retirees is modelled. This is kept as simple as possible and 
uses the fact that, given an annual increase of the wage-rate of 2.25%, if an individual 
                                                          
10
 Those employed by the government, but on a temporary basis are not considered to be civil servants. 
For civil servants, the pensions are liked to the course of wages. This is the so-called “automatische 
perekwatie”. 
11
 Festjens uses this constant growth rate from 1999. 
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becomes 65 one year after 1992
12
, his or her pension income can be expected to be 
2.25% higher than the pension benefit of someone who retires in 1992. Now suppose 
an individual who is 67 in the year 1995, or 3 years after the base-year 1992. Then we 
know that he was 67-3=64 years of age in 1992. Using the above line of reasoning, we 
then know that, compared to the pension benefit of someone who is 67 in 1992, his or 
her pension benefit has increased with (1+0.0225)
65-64
, accounting for the one year 
between 1992 and 1995 that the individual was not retired, and with (1+L0.0225)67-65 
for the two years between 1995 and 1992 that he or she was retired. In this, the 
variable L denotes the „rate of linkage‟ which is between 0 and 1 (in the case of no 
link at all and a full link between wages and pension benefits, respectively). More 
generally speaking, the difference between the average pension benefit of somebody 
who is a>65 years old in the future year y and in 1992, can be written as  
 ( . ) ( . )
max ,( )
1 0 0225 1 0 0225
0 1992
   
  L
y
 
Equation 1 
where  = max[0,(y-1992)-(a-65)].  
The advantage of this upgrading technique is that it is simple and straightforward. The  
disadvantage should be mentioned as well, however, and is that the model does not 
allow „backward-changes‟. If we would set L equal to zero in the year 2000, for 
instance, the model would uprate the pension benefits as if there was no indexation 
from 1992 up to 2000.  If we would then set L equal  to .5 in 2005, the pension 
benefits would be uprated as if there was 50%-wage indexation from 1992 up to 2005. 
In other words, no past values of L are taken into account. The user of the model 
therefore has compete freedom in picking L for any simulation year, but the model 
will behave as if this value of L has been set at this particular value since the 
beginning of the simulation period i.e. since 1992. Of  course, this is the direct result 
of the fact that the model is not capable of forming individual stock-variables, as 
mentioned earlier. The model disentangles various „upgrading-regimes‟ for the 
various individual income-components in the dataset: labour income increases with 
2.25% per year, whereas pension income remains constant (in real terms).  
 What will happen to poverty rates and income inequality in this first scenario 
or - simulation variant, i.e. if we let wages and (non-pension) social security benefits 
                                                          
12
 Indeed, the implicit assumption is that all those who are not yet retired, will retire at 65. 
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grow with 2.25% per year while leaving pension benefits unchanged (L=0)? It is clear 
that this will result in higher poverty rates, as compared to the situation  where wages 
do not change as well. Likewise, income inequality can be expected to increase as 
well, as one category of individuals (namely pensioners) will see their level of their 
income deteriorate, relative to that of non-pensioners. 
The next important question which will be dealt with, is the following: what is 
the effect of the assumption on partial indexation which the Federal Planning Bureau 
of Belgium uses as a basis for their projections of the Belgian state-wide pension 
system? Remember that these assumptions were an annual wage growth of 2.25% and 
an 50%-indexation (L=.5). This is the second scenario or - simulation variant. 
Compared to the first variant (economic growth and no linkage to the wage-rate 
whatsoever), we can expect the relative income position of the retirees to deteriorate 
less than in the case of no wage-indexation, but more than in the case of no growth of 
wages (the base-variant).  
 
2.3.3. Introducing a wage-barrier in the determination of the level of the pension 
benefit. 
 
The third and fourth simulation variants both introduce another additional 
assumption, which is that the future pension benefits of individuals who are not yet 
retired and who are not civil-servants, are subject to a „wage-barrier‟. Since this wage-
barrier is a new concept which has not been mentioned before, it requires some 
explanation: since 1981, employees contribute a certain fraction of their full income to 
the pension system. By contrast, the benefit which they can expect to receive is 
determined by the wage, up to a certain maximum. So, if an employee earns more than 
this wage-barrier, one contributes pension premium over the entire income, whereas 
the future pension benefit is limited to the income below the wage-barrier. Moreover, 
and that is relevant in this context, if an individual earns more than this wage-barrier, 
the future pension benefit does not follow the 2.25% annual increase of the wage-rate, 
but only the annual increase of this barrier. In other words, this wage-barrier makes 
the pension contributions progressive, implying some solidarity among pension-
contributors. Moreover, as the growth rate of the wage-barrier is lower than that of the 
wages themselves, it causes the distribution of pension benefits to become smaller 
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over time. The Belgian Federal Planning Bureau assumes that the wage-barrier 
increases only by 1% per year, whereas wages increase by 2.25% per year. The result 
of this is that more and more working employees will find themselves with a gross 
income up or above the wage-barrier. As a consequence, the increase of the average 
pension benefit will over time slow down, compared to the growth rate of the average 
wage. The problem which will be dealt with here is what the effect of this assumption 
is on the distribution of pension income, income inequality and so forth. The third 
simulation variant partially introduces the wage-barrier without assuming partial 
linkage between the course of wages and the pension benefit. The fourth and last 
scenario combines the assumptions of scenarios 2 and 3: it introduces a simultaneous 
partial linkage between pension benefits and wages and the implementation of the 
wage-barrier. 
 How does the model include this wage-barrier? This will be explained shortly. 
But first of all, what is the historical course of this wage-barrier? Figure 11 depicts the 
historical course of the wage barrier, both in current prices and constant prices 
(1992=100) where the latter is completed with the fictitious future development given 
a growth rate of 1% per  year. 
Figure 11: development of the historical and fictitious wage-barrier (source: van Eeckhoutte, 
1997, p. 299). 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
9
year
1
0
0
0
 B
fr
w age-barrier
(const.p.1992)
w age-barrier
(curr.p.)
 
The wage-barrier in current prices is almost 1.1 million Belgian francs per year  
(Bef. 1.089.988, to be exact) in 1985. It then increases to almost 1.4 million francs in 
1997. However, if expressed in constant prices of 1992, this increase is reversed in a 
decrease, though of a very small magnitude. It seems that the actual implementation of 
 31 
a 1% real annual growth of this wage-barrier would imply a change in the trend of the 
last decennium. 
 If STATION would have been a dynamic microsimulation model, the 
inclusion of an increasing wage-barrier would have been very simple. For every 
employee, we would have compared his or her gross labour income -being the base of 
the future pension income- with the wage-barrier. Then -if necessary- the future 
pension income would be set as a function of the labour income, but only up to the 
wage-barrier. However, in a static microsimulation model such as STATION, 
individuals do not „shift trough time‟; only the weight factors change. Consequently, 
the above technique can not be applied and the inclusion of a wage-barrier is less 
straightforward, although still possible. The basic line of thought lies close to the way 
in which the indexation process is modelled and uses the fact that, given an annual 
increase of the wage-rate of 2.25%, if an individual becomes 65 retires one year after 
1992, his or her pension income can be expected to be 2.25% higher than the pension 
benefit of someone who retires in 1992, that is, if one did not earn more than the 
wage-barrier, of course. If so, this effect of wage-change is limited to the effect of the 
change of the wage-barrier. As said, this change is based on the historical figures from 
1992 to 1997 (which means it is negative but very close to zero) and assumed to be 
1% from 2000 onward. 
 The implementation of such a wage-barrier involves several serial steps: first 
of all, given the assumptions on the level of the wage-barrier and the annual growth 
rates of both this wage-barrier and the general wages, calculate the proportion of 
employees and self-employed aged between 60 and 64 who will have a gross income 
up or over this wage-barrier in the future year y. Call this percentage py. This number 
py can be interpreted as the probability that one will draw an older employee whose 
income is limited in its effect on the pension benefit from the sample of older 
employees. The reason why only older employees are selected, is that the assumption 
is that the „profile‟ of older employees can be used as a proxy for the profile of 
younger retirees
13
. The second step then involves the multiplication of the number of 
                                                          
13
 Indeed, by doing so, a certain overestimation of the empirical effect of the wage-barrier on pension 
income is inevitable and must be accepted. The reason for this is the following: if the proportion of 
workers earning more than the wage-barrier increases in the future, there is reason to believe that it has 
been doing so in the past as well. So, in a certain year, the proportion of young retirees who have earned 
more than the barrier in their last years of their career, can be expected to be lower than the proportion 
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retirees in the year y who have reached 65 between 1992 and y and who have been 
either employees or self-employed (the group of  potential limited retirees) with this 
py, resulting in the number of „actually‟ limited retirees. Denote this LR. So we are 
now in the situation that LR individuals must be selected from the group of  retirees 
which meet the above-stated requirements. How can this be done? By simply using 
the fact that only the richer pensioners (those with the highest pension benefit) will 
have „encountered‟ the wage-barrier. So, serially rank the sample according 
descending pension income and select the first LR individuals from this ranked set of 
data. For these selected individuals, the uprating-equation becomes  
   )1992(,0max)0225.01(]0225.0)1(1[ yLWB  
Equation 2 
where  = max[0,(y-1992)-(a-65)]  
for somebody who is a>65 years old in the future year y. The variable 1-WB denotes 
the growth rate of the wage-barrier as a fraction of the growth rate of the wage. It is 
written as above so that WB=0 implies that the wage-barrier is fully linked to the real 
course of wages, which in the context of this uprating-model is equivalent to saying 
that the wage-barrier does not exist at all
14
. Following the assumption of the Federal 
Planning Bureau, the annual growth rate of the wage-barrier is 1%, whereas the 
growth rate of wages is 2.25%. WB is therefore equal to 1-(1%/2.25%)=1-
0.444=0.556.  
Now how does the introduction of this wage-barrier change the above results? 
To recapitulate, the introduction of a wage-barrier (of which the indexation is limited) 
implies that not all individuals see their pension income being fully indexed. This is 
only the case for those whose income is below the barrier or ceiling. Consequently, 
one can expect the poverty-increasing effect of wage-indexation of pension benefits to 
be reduced even further, compared to the case of limited or no- indexation, where this 
effect will only emerge in the longer run. And what can we expect to be the effect of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
of current older workers who earn more than the barrier. However, trying to form a correction factor for 
this  difference would be a very complex task (since current retirees have not all retired in the same 
year, but in one of a whole range of years) and would require quite some ad-hoc assumptions, which 
would make the model far more complex, and less trustworthy. Given the expected small magnitude of 
the overestimation (after all, the age differences between older workers and younger retirees are not that 
large since there are retirees younger than 65 as well) seems acceptable. 
14
 In the future, that is. It implicitly does exist up to 1992 since its effects are reflected by the actual 
distribution of pension income in the data set. 
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the wage-barrier on the income distribution? Will income inequality decrease or 
increase? As a result of the implementation of the wage-barrier, the growth of the 
highest employees-pension benefits (and that of former self-employed) becomes 
dampened. As a consequence, one could conclude that these highest pension benefits 
would converge to the mean, thereby reducing the overall inequality of pension 
benefits. However,  this conclusion would be wrong, since it implicitly assumes that 
the highest pension-benefits of ex-employees and self-employed are the highest 
pensions of the whole sample. But this might not be the case, since we could very well 
assume that the pension benefits of numerous former civil servants (which after all are 
based on the final wage instead of the average wage) will be higher than these limited 
pension benefits of ex-employees. As a result, the pension benefits which are limited 
by the introduction of the wage-barrier are not necessarily in the highest pension-
income deciles and the effect of this wage-barrier on the distribution of income is 
therefore ambiguous. If the highest pensions of former employees are found high in 
the sample-wide distribution of pension benefits, then the introduction of the wage-
barrier  will result in a decreasing income inequality. But if, on the other hand, 
employees and self-employed are not so much found  in the top of the income 
distribution (apart from a very small group of very high-income earners, maybe) then 
the implementation of the wage-barrier will cause income inequality to increase. In 
either way, this would only hold in the short run and noticing that the strength of this 
effect remains unclear. We said that this would be the case „at least in the short run‟. 
Doesn‟t this hold for the long run as well? No. In fact, whatever the short run effect of 
the implementation of the wage-barrier on the sample-wide inequality of pension 
benefits is, it can be argued that the inequality of pension benefits will increase in the 
very long run.  To see why this is the case, let us recapitulate that the direction of the 
effect of the implementation of the wage-barrier on pension-income inequality 
depends on the location of the (limited) pensions of former employees and self-
employed in the sample-wide distribution of income. If these pension benefits are high 
in the income-distribution, its limitation will cause income inequality to decrease. On 
the other hand, if these pension benefits are not in the top-percentiles of the pension-
income distribution, the sample-wide income inequality will either remain stable or 
increase. Now let us combine the above line of reasoning with the notion of 
„automatic perequation‟, as a result of which the pension benefits of the former civil 
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servants are fully linked to the development of wages. So, irrespective of the 
simulation variant, the pension benefits of former civil servants increase by 2% per 
year. This in turn means that the pension benefits of former employees and self-
employed deteriorate relative to the pension benefits of former civil servants, and this 
relative decrease becomes stronger the further in the future we go. Consequently, over 
time, the pension-incomes of non-civil servants will „move down‟ the sample-wide 
distribution of pension incomes and the inequality-increasing effect of the 
implementation of the wage-barrier will therefore become stronger as time goes by. 
Having said this, let us continue with looking at the actual data. First of all, 
how does the proportion of older employees (and self-employed) change as a result of 
the difference between the wage-change and the change of the wage-barrier? To see 
this, consider figure 12.  
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Figure 12: proportion of working employees and self-employed individuals between 60 and 64 
who earn more than the wage-barrier. 
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According to the SEP-dataset, in the base-year 1992, 9.5% of the employees (and self-
employed) earn more than the wage-barrier. This percentage remains somewhere 
around 12% until 2005, when it increases rapidly to a bit less than 17% in 2010. It 
then remains on the same level until 2025 when it starts a continuous increase, this 
time to 30.8% in 2050. It can easily be seen that it is not just the difference in growth 
rates between wages and the wage-barrier which causes the growth of the proportion 
of individuals earning more than the wage-barrier
15
; instead, the changing age-
distribution clearly has a strong impact on this proportion
16
. As a last remark, note that 
this measure does not hold for civil servants.  
 Let us summarise the various scenarios by means of the following table. 
Table 1: Simulation variants or - scenarios. 
scenario wage-growth  part. linkage 
of pension ben. 
part. linkage of 
wage-barrier 
Notation 
first scenario or 
base-rate scenario 
X - 
 
- (n,n) 
second scenario X X - (y,n) 
third scenario X - X (n,y) 
fourth scenario X X X (y,y) 
 
                                                          
15
 If so, the line would be convex and monotonically increasing. 
16
 Showing the exact cause of these changes would ivolve knowing the probability of earning more than 
the wage-barrier for individuals of different one-year age groups and combining this with the changing 
age-patterns resulting from the reweighting process. This would lead us too far. 
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Table 1 clearly shows that all scenarios assume an annual real wage growth of 2.25% 
per year. The first scenario is the point of departure and assumes no linkage between 
wages and ongoing pensions (which means that pension benefits are only linked to the 
rate of inflation) and the non-existence of any wage-barrier (which is equivalent  to 
saying that the wage-barrier completely follows the real course of wages, at least in 
the context of upgrading). The second and third scenarios introduce the partial linkage 
of pensions to the course of wages and the implementation of the wage-barrier,  
respectively. Finally, the fourth scenario combines the last-mentioned assumptions of 
the second and third scenarios. The notation will be explained later and is only 
mentioned for completeness‟ sake. Before ending this discussion of the simulation 
variants, and the potential policy measures which disentangle them, the reader should 
realise that these measures only describe the „future‟, which in this model starts in 
1993. For, the past situation and the policy measures then taken, are reflected in the 
1992-dataset, which is transformed to describe the future situation. So, these past 
measures and their effect on the income distribution in 1992 are taken to the future as 
well. They can never be neutralised or changed. 
 
2.3.4. Contributions. 
 
  Next, we turn to the income-side of the model. Hitherto, changes in total 
pension benefits paid out, did not have any consequences for the net-labour incomes. 
This of course violates the Pay-As-You-Go-character of the Belgian pension system.  
Of course, a changing total pension benefit, be it the result of a changing dependency 
ratio or resulting from a changing average pension benefit of the retirees, must be 
covered by a decrease of the total income of  the non-retirees. As we deal with total 
household incomes, and to keep things simple, let us start from the assumption that 
every increase of the total income of the retirees in a certain year must be covered by 
the non-retirees in the same year. Denote variables expressed in capitals to be 
aggregates of individual-level variables. Then the following PAYG-equation holds for 
all years t:   
 t nr
t
nr
t t
r
t
r
ti N i N  
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Equation 3 
where i
t
nr and i
t
r are the per-capita household incomes of individuals  who are not 
retired, respectively retired in year t. Likewise N
t
nr  and N
t
r are the numbers of retired 
and non-retired individuals in period t. Furthermore, denote t and t the contribution- 
respectively benefit rate (i.e. the contribution, respectively benefit as a fraction of the 
wage) in time t. Suppose t=t/t  so t is the contribution rate relative to the benefit 
rate. By definition, equation 3 must hold for period 1992 and all other periods 1992+z 
 2050. So, the PAYG-equations for 1992 and 1992+z 
are 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992i N i Nnr nr r r and 
1992 1992 1992 1992 1992    z nr
z
nr
z
r
z
r
zi N i N . Of course, in 
practice, the above PAYG-equation does not hold for 1992. Total household income 
of the retirees is not generated by contributions of the non-retirees; only pension 
income is. However, formulating the problem the above way, gives the possibility to 
take the ratio of both the left and right-hand side of the PAYG-equation in both 
periods of time.  


1992
1992
1992 1992
1992 1992
1992 1992
1992 1992    
 
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Equation 4 
Now the assumption that all 1992-income of the retirees is covered by contributions 
of the non-retirees no longer holds, since we have expressed the above equation in 
relative changes. Put differently, the implicit assumption underlying equation 4 is that 
the relative change of the income of the retirees, relative to that of the non-retirees, 
must be covered by contributions by the non-retirees. Without loss of generality, 
assume 1992=1 (so that 1992+z denotes the change of the contribution relative to the 
unknown 1992- value) and rewrite equation 4 to: 
i N
i N
i N
i N
nr nr
nr
z
nr
z
r
z
r
z
r r
z
1992 1992
1992 1992
1992 1992
1992 1992
1992
 
 
    
Equation 5 
Equation 5 is expressed in such a way that the change of the contribution, 1992+z, can 
be expressed as a combination of the inverse change of the total income of the non-
retirees and the change of the total income of the retirees. By assuming the change of 
the per capita income is the same for both retirees and non-retirees (i.e. inr
1992+z
/ inr
1992
 
= ir
1992+z
/ir
1992
) it can easily be seen that 1992+z becomes a direct function of 
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demographic ageing. Of course, we can also assume no demographic change (i.e. both 
the number of retirees and non-retirees increase by the same rate between 1992 and 
1992+z) in which case 1992+z becomes a function of the proportional change of the 
per capita incomes of the retirees and the non-retirees.  
 By multiplying the (1992+z)-household incomes of individuals by 1/ ,  
we therefore take into account the fraction by which the contributions at t+z must 
increase. However, by doing so, it is assumed that all non-retired individuals 
contribute the same fraction of their income. Rather, it would be preferable to keep the 
progressivity of the coverage of this burden as close as possible to the progressivity of 
the tax system as a whole, since any real increase of the amount to be paid would be 
done through the tax-scheme. However, attempts to achieve this unfortunately failed, 
so it was decided to stick to the above model. 
 This chapter started with discussing extensively how the 1992- wave of the 
SEP-dataset is modified to meet future demographic changes, both on the age-
distribution as well as the distribution of household-types given the age-distribution. 
The second step in static microsimulation is uprating. This was discussed in paragraph 
2.3. This uprating takes the form of introducing a partial linkage of the pension benefit 
to the course of wages, as well as a possible implementation of a wage-barrier. As a 
consequence of both uprating and the transformation of the weights, a PAYG-
equation was introduced in order to maintain the equality between contributions and 
benefits. In the next section, some practical problems which one gets to deal with 
when building a static microsimulation model, will be discussed. 
 
2.4. Static microsimulation in practice: pitfalls and solutions. 
 
 In this section, some practical problems encountered when developing 
STATION will be discussed, together with the (sometimes more pragmatic than 
elegant) solutions to these problems. This section is meant for those readers interested 
in the practical „how-and-why‟ of static microsimulation. However, having read it is 
not a necessary condition for the understanding of the other sections. Those who are 
just interested in the outcomes of the model and who thinks the general description 
given in the last paragraphs is enough, are invited to skip this paragraph and move to 
the third chapter, where the simulation results will be presented and described. 
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The first pitfall which will be dealt with in this section, concerns the so-called 
„structural deviation of the weighting factors‟. Next, the problems which come with 
observing empty cells in the 1992-dataset will be considered. Thirdly, problems 
related to sample bias in the original dataset will be considered. Lastly -and this is 
rather important- the fundamental problems involving the use of individual 
transformations when considering household-data will be discussed. As a result of 
these problems, we will adopt the household-average transformation for all 
individuals within a certain household. 
 
2.4.1. The first pitfall: Structural deviation of the weighting factors.  
 
First of all, let us consider the structural deviation of the weighting factors.  
There is no reason why the average age-gender index
17
 to a certain future year, taken 
over all age groups for a certain future year, should be equal to 1. This is equivalent to 
saying that the average transformation of the individual weight variables need not be 
zero. On the contrary: one can expect the average index to be larger than 1 since this 
reflects the general population growth. However, the transformations derived in the 
second submodule are based on the difference between, on the one hand, the LIPRO-
distribution of the age-gender modified dataset and, on the other hand, the projected 
LIPRO-distribution. As the percentages in both distributions necessarily add up to 
100, the summed difference between the percentages (taken for each LIPRO-category) 
must be equal to zero and so should therefore the average difference. However, even 
though the summed difference between the percentages must add up to zero, there is 
no reason why the growth rates (or the transformation rates) should. To see this, 
consider the following example of two years and two categories. Suppose that in the 
base-year, the sample consists of two categories. Suppose that 40% of the sample 
belongs to the first category, which means that 60% belongs to the second category. 
Suppose furthermore that we know that in the future year, these percentages will be 
50% and 50%, respectively. As the percentages add up to 100%, it is easy to see that 
the differences add up to zero (40%-50%+60%-50% = 0). However, the growth rates 
are .25 and -.166 and they clearly not neutralise each other.  Fortunately, in practice, 
                                                          
17
 The number by which the household-weighting variable of 1992 must be multiplied to get the future 
weighting variable. 
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this does not turn out to be a major problem, since the percentages are not that deviant 
as they are in the above example. In practice, the „structural deviation‟ (the difference 
between the actual average transformation and zero) is very small, fortunately: it does 
not exceed 2% for any future year. 
What are the consequences of this structural deviation on the simulation 
results? If the transformations to family-classifications do not meet the requirement 
that they are on average equal to zero, this transformation affects the age-gender 
structure and even the size of the population in an unpredictable way. In other words, 
the transformation to family-classification are no longer neutral since they in some 
way affect the distribution of other variables, such as age or income, even if this 
nonneutrality is as small as 2%. To solve this problem, a two-step procedure is 
adopted. In the first step, the transformation rates for all combinations of gender-age 
group and family-type are calculated for a certain future year. These transformation 
rates are based on the (modified) projections of Boulanger et.al., and are nonneutral 
for the reasons just explained. In the second step, these individual transformations are 
divided by their overall average, thus imposing their neutrality without affecting the 
relative differences between these transformations. 
 
2.4.2. The second pitfall: Empty cells. 
 
The second pitfall which is to be discussed now, deals with empty cells in the 
original dataset. A cell is defined as a certain combination of characteristics, in this 
case gender and family-type. A modification made to the projected data is that the 
weighting to gender and family-type is done in ten-year age groups instead of five-
year age groups, for both males and females separately. Moreover, all individuals of 
70 and older are taken together for every combination of gender and family-type. Of 
course, this makes the simulation results less accurate since not all information is 
used. Nevertheless, the reason why this has been done, touches directly at the heart of 
static microsimulation. In the following table, the relative numbers of individuals 
being in one of four age groups and the LIPRO-classification is presented for 1992. 
Now remember that the individual weighting factors are transformed in such a way 
that the transformed sample distribution meets the projections of Boulanger et.al. For 
every combination of age-group and LIPRO-category, this is done by taking the 
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growth rate between the 1992-percentage and the projected percentage. And this is 
exactly where things go wrong: for instance, from the Boulanger-tables, we know that 
about .01% of the population between 70 and 74 will be cohabiting and will have 
children living in the same house (LIPRO-category number 8). 
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Table 2: relative number of individuals in age-and family categories, 1992. 
LIPRO 60age<65 65age<70 70age<75 75age 
1 .00 .00 .00 .00 
2 .00 .00 .00 .00 
3 .42 .00 .00 .00 
4 16.46 23.68 34.19 53.18 
5 54.17 56.32 48.5 29.43 
6 21.30 14.03 7.71 2.42 
7 1.98 1.54 2.7 .61 
8 .35 .00 3.88 .00 
9 4.67 3.3 .00 6.00 
10 .65 1.12 3.00 8.36 
 
Unfortunately, in our 1992-sample, this percentage is zero. Consequently, it becomes 
impossible to calculate the growth rate and this in turn means that there will be no 
way in which the transformation of the weighting factors can ever make the sample 
meet the future distribution. In this and other cases, the whole technique of static 
microsimulation breaks down, since one empty „1992-cell‟ implies that the 
proportional sizes of other 1992-cells are relatively larger than they would have been, 
would the cell not have been empty. In other words, all the other growth- or 
transformation rates will be different from what they would have been if there were no 
empty cells. Consequently, the existence of only a couple of  empty cells (combined 
with not-empty future-values of that cell) can jeopardize the trustworthiness of the 
entire model. There is no way in which this problem can be solved, if it emerges, but 
its implications can be minimised or even completely avoided by defining the 
different cells as such that the number of empty cells with non-zero projections is 
minimised, which has been done
18
. With regard to LIPRO-classification 8 (cohabiting 
with children) and 9 (head of an one-parent family), it is clear that clustering the 
columns to two age-categories (younger than 70 and older than 70) solves the problem 
                                                          
18
 Indeed, if the 1992-cell is empty, and the future cell is empty as well, there is no problem since the 
growth rate can then be set equal to 1. 
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of empty cells
19
.  The interpretation of this grouping together basically is that it is 
assumed that a change in one age-group over seventy with respect to another age 
group over seventy, does not significantly affect the distribution of family-type. Stated 
differently, the probability that an individual will be observed in a certain family-type, 
is assumed to be more or less the same for all age groups from 70 years of age on.  
 
2.4.3. The third pitfall: Sample bias. 
 
 The third pitfall which will be considered is related to the existence of sample-
bias in the 1992-dataset. As said before, the projections of the age-gender structure of 
the population take the form of indices with 1992 as their base year. This basically 
implies that the 1992-proportions are reweighted according to these indices. As a 
result, if there is some sample-bias in the dataset, it will not be „solved‟ by the 
weighting process: all projections for all future years will suffer from the same sample 
bias. As opposed to this, the reweighting of the sample with respect to the gender- 
family type distribution is done by comparing the 1992-proportions of LIPRO with the 
projected proportions. Consequently, if there is sample bias in the base year which 
affects the 1992-proportions, the weighting process will take that into account, and the 
sample-bias will not emerge in the projected data
20
. The drawback of this is that the 
comparison of the sample between the base-year and either one of the future years is 
„polluted‟ by the sample bias. An idea on the possible existence of sample bias was 
formed by looking at the 1996-transformation values. The assumption was that, given 
age and gender, the probability of being observed in a certain family-type remained 
unchanged (or changed only very little) between 1992 and 1996. Under this 
assumption and correcting for ageing, the difference between the age distributions in 
1992 and 1996 would reflect the sample bias. Indeed, the results suggested the 
possible existence of sample-bias, though it is empirically not very important. The 
number of children from one-parent families and the number of singles are 
underestimated (at most -.5%), whereas the number of married individuals, both with 
and without children, is overestimated (at most +.4%). A possible explanation for the 
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 It can be seen from table 2 as well, that the clustering of some LIPRO-categories while keeping the 
age-groups constant would not have solved the problem. 
20
 Of course, sample bias on variables other than those in the weighting process are not taken into 
account: they do not cease to exist. 
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underestimation of the number of singles in the SEP data of 1992, relative to the 
projections of Boulanger et.al., is the following: whereas the SEP data are „actual‟ 
data -gathered by questionnaires, the Boulanger-projections are based on official 
figures of the Belgian population (Volkstellinggegevens), which more reflect the legal 
(tax-) situation. It is very well possible that surviving partners actually cohabit, 
whereas they claim to be living alone, this to prevent losing pension rights. 
 Even though this sample bias does seem to be rather small at first sight, it 
turned out to have some effect on other variables (pension income, for instance). The 
result of this bias is that the comparison of the average pension income between 1992 
and 1996 is polluted. This problem was solved by multiplying the 1992-dataset with 
LIPRO-proportions from the volkstellinggegevens 1991
21
, thereby neutralising the 
sample-bias.  
 
2.4.4. The fourth pitfall: Households versus individuals
22
. 
 
 Now we turn to what probably is the most fundamental (as well as complex) 
problem which we will deal with in  this section. Up to now, the simulation results 
were based upon individually-transformed weighting factors.  These transformations 
are based on the indices reflecting the proportional changes, specified to five-year age 
groups and gender. To explain the methodology in more detail, let us turn to a 
strongly stylised example. 
 
period t household 1:  1 individual of 20 years old 
    1 individual of 60 years old 
 household 2:  1 individual of 20 years old 
    1 individual of 30 years old 
 N=4 
 
                                                          
21
 The period of investigation of the SEP-data of 1992 actually started in december 1991 and ended in 
april 1992. The figures from the volkstelling are of the beginning of 1991, so the intertemporal 
difference is less than one year.  
22
 The author would like to thank Karel Van den  Bosch for his help with this paragraph. 
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Suppose that the population is as follows in the future period t+n,: 
 
period t+n    3 individuals of 20 years old 
    1 individual of 30 years old 
    2 individuals of 60 years old 
 
 N=6 
 
where N is the population size. Note that we have no information on  which 
household what individuals are in.  
The first step is the derivation of the population indices to the three age groups 
(20,30 and 60). This is done by, for every age group, relating the absolute numbers of 
individuals in both time periods to each other.  
 age  index   growth rate of index (t=100) 
  
 20  100*(3/2)  .5 
 30  100*(1/1)  0 
 60  100*(2/1)  1. 
 
Note that the average growth rate of the index is equal to the population growth 
between t and t+n. (.(5+1)/3=.5 = (6-4)/4) So, the individual data is transformed on  
the basis of the growth rate of  the population indices for period t+n. However, this 
causes a problem, since it means that individuals in the same household are 
transformed differently.  As an example, let us consider household 1: the weight of  
the youngest individual is increased with 50% whereas the weight of the older 
individual doubles (the increase is 100%).  As a result, the notion of „household‟ loses 
its meaning, since the one individual becomes much more important than the other. 
One could say that a half individual of age 30 and an individual of age 60 enter the 
household, which means that the original  household no longer exists, of course. 
So, at the one hand, most income figures (average income, income inequality 
and poverty) are based on the household-income. However, at the other hand, the 
original households themselves lose their meaning, due to a inconsistent 
transformation within the household.  Of course, this is a very serious flaw which 
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undermines the trustworthiness of the simulation results. How can we solve this 
problem? We need a consistent transformator i.e. a transformator which is the same 
for all individuals in the household (demand 1).  Moreover,  this consistent 
transformator should not disturb the proportional sizes of various subcategories in the 
sample (demand 2); at least, the disturbance should be small.  Thirdly, this consistent 
transformator must meet the same demand as the individual transformator (the growth 
rate of the index) does, namely that its average value is equal to the population growth 
rate (demand 3) . In our above example,  we have two households. Denote the 
unknown household-transformators A for the first household, and B for the second 
household.  Moreover, we have 3 age-categories, so that our model is overidentified. 
However,  it can be shown that there is one unique solution in this very simple case. 
The equations describing A and B are the following: 
 
1. 1*A +1*B = 3   (age category 20) 
2. 1*B = 1   (age category 30) 
3.  1*A = 2   (age category 60) 
 
So, we get the solution A=2 and B=1. To verify these results, let us restore the derive 
the future numbers of individuals in  the three age-categories, based on these 
consistent transformators. Let us start with the group of individuals of 20 years old. In 
the original dataset, there is one 20-year old in the first household and one in the 
second household. So, the future (transformed) number of 20-year olds is equal to 
1*(2)+1*1=3. For the other age-categories, these numbers become 1*1=1 for the 30-
year olds, and 1*2=2 for the 60-year olds. Indeed, these numbers match the future 
population as presented earlier. To check demand 3, we need to see whether the 
average value of the growth rates derived from A and B, is equal to the population 
growth rate, (which is 6/4-1=0.5). It is easily seen that this is the case: the average 
growth rate is (B-1+A-1)/2 =1/2=.5.  
Of course, the above example is oversimplified in the sense that there exists an unique 
solution. In fact, in a cross-sectional dataset of reasonable size, one can assume that 
there will be more households than categories of relevant variables. For example, let 
us consider the following -again highly stylised- dataset, consisting of 5 households 
(in 1992) and 3 age-categories. 
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       unknown transformator 
period t  
household 1:  1 individual of 20 years old  A 
   1 individual of 30 years old 
   1 individual of 30 years old 
 
household 2:  1 individual of 30 years old  B 
   1 individual of 60 years old 
   1 individual of 60 years old 
household 3:  1 individual of 20 years old  C 
   1 individual of 60 years old 
   1 individual of 60 years old 
household 4:  1 individual of 20 years old  D 
   1 individual of 30 years old 
   1 individual of 60 years old 
household 5:  1 individual of 20 years old  E 
   1 individual of 20 years old 
   1 individual of 30 years old 
 
Assume again that we know from external sources that the population is at t+n will be 
exactly the same as in time t, but with one household added to it: 
 
household 6:  1 individual of 60 years old 
   1 individual of 60 years old 
   1 individual of 60 years old 
 
So, analogous to the first example, we now are looking for 5 unknown variables A to 
E, having 3 age-categories. 
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The equations describing these unknown variables are the following 
 
1A+1C+1D+2E = 5  (age category 20) 
2A+1B+1D+1E = 5  (age category 30) 
2B+2C+1D   = 8  (age category 60) 
 
As there are 5 unknown variables and 3 equations, we can conclude that the model is 
underidentified
23
. 
 To recapitulate, the number of unknown variables we are looking for  is equal 
to the number of households, whereas the number of equations is equal to the number 
of categories the data is grouped into. If we have 2 households and two age-categories, 
the model is identified, meaning that the consistent household-transformations can be 
derived. However, if we have 5 households and 3 age categories, the model becomes 
to a large extent unidentified.  
When introducing this second stylised example, it was claimed that this 
situation was more in line with reality than  the first example. Now let‟s see if this is 
true. We know that the individuals in our actual 1992 sample can be subdivided to 
gender (2 categories), household-type following the LIPRO-classification (9 
categories) and five-year age group (20 categories). Then the total number of 
categories is 2*9*20=360.  This is the total number of equations. Again, for every 
household consisting of the same numbers of household-members in the same 
combination of these three dimensions (gender, LIPRO and age-group), an uniform 
(consistent) transformator must be derived. So,  if we assume that every household 
consists of a number of individuals, occupying an unique combination of the three 
relevant variables, then the number of unknown variables is equal to the number of 
households, which is 3821. It  is of course possible that more households form the 
                                                          
23
 Following the Rank Condition (Gujarati, 1988, p. 588) the matrix of coefficients is:  
  5    -1       1   -1   -2  
                                                            5  -2  -1       -1   -1 
                                                            8        -2  -2  -1            
 
For the three equations, the relevant matrices are A1= -1, A2 =  1 and A3=  -1  -2 
       -2  -2                 -1  -1 
 
In this case, the determinants of A1 and A2 are undetermined, whereas the determinant of A3 is -1. So, 
two out of three equations fail the rank condition and it is therefore safe to say that the model is 
unidentified. 
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same combination of cells, in which case the total number of unknown variables is 
lower than 3821. However, this does not change the inevitable conclusion that the 
model describing the unknown household-transformations is underidentified. This 
means that there is no algebraic solution, resulting in the consistent household-
transformations. 
 So, where do we go from here? As it is obvious that there is no algebraic 
solution to the problem, we could try to find a numeric solution.  The only  way in 
which a solution for a certain future year could be found, would be by iteratively 
adjusting a consistent transformation-variable to reflect the distribution of gender, 
LIPRO and age-group as much as possible. However, not only would this be 
extremely CPU-consuming, most likely, but there would also be no guarantee that a 
solution would eventually be reached.  Moreover, it is very well possible that the 
numerical solution for a certain year would be totally different from the numerical 
solution of another  year, thereby making the simulation results highly unstable over 
time. 
For the above reasons,  a „second-best solution‟ was tried out: the household-
average growth - or transformation rate of the age-specific growth rates of the indices 
clearly meets the demand of consistency  Let us turn back to the first stylised example 
to explain what is happening. Remember that the indices are 1.5, 1 and 2 for 
individuals of 20, 30 and 60 years of age, respectively. Based on these individual 
transformations , the household-average transformations are 
 
 Household 1: (1.5+2)/2=1.75  
 Household 2: (1.5+1)/2=1.25 
 
So the household-average growth rates of the index are 1.75 and 1.25. for household 1 
and 2, respectively.  What happens if we transform the population at t with these 
growth rates?  
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    t  t+n  true numbers t+n 
 individuals(age=20) 2 1*1.75+1*1.25=3 3 
 individuals(age=30) 1 1*1.25=1.25  1 
 individuals(age=60) 1 1*1.75=1.75  2 
As a result of the household-transformation, the simulated sizes of the various age 
categories (column 2) is no longer equal to the  sizes actual of the age categories based 
on the individual transformations (column 3), which is exactly what we expected, 
based on the earlier explanations. The question is not if there is such a disturbance of 
using the household-transformations on the proportional sizes of sample categories 
(that we know already), but merely what the magnitude of these disturbances is. This 
will be shown by subsequently subdividing the population into various categories. 
These categories are gender (male, female), age category (younger than 20, between 
20 and 64 and from 65 onward). Denote PERC1 the proportional size of a certain 
category given individual transformation. This the „correct‟ proportion. Denote 
PERC2 the proportional size of the same category, but given the household-average 
transformation. For the three cases (gender gq, age AG and household-type LIPRO), 
the average absolute difference between the proportions (i.e. the percentage-point 
differences) are depicted in the following figure: 
Figure 13: percentage-point differences between individual- and household-average reweighting 
of the sample. 
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So, for a certain year, the value for gq (gender) is the average value of the proportional 
absolute difference for males and females, where this difference is simply the 
proportion under the assumption  of the individual transformation minus the 
proportion under the assumption of the household-average transformation.  
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Knowing the average absolute difference is not enough; we might also want to 
know the maximum value underlying this average difference. These maximum 
absolute differences is the maximal bias which a subcategory can encounter if the 
household-average transformation is used instead of the individual transformation.  
Figure 14: maximal absolute percentage-point difference between individual and household-
average reweighting. 
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This figure shows that the maximal bias is less than 3.5%-point.  
So, the choice we have boils down to the following: either we use the 
individual transformations with the rather fundamental problem that the figures are 
based on a non-existing notion of household, or we use the household-average 
transformations and we accept the biases. Unfortunately, there is no clear-cut answer 
as it is a arbitrary choice, but it is straightforward that we will have to get an idea on 
the relative importance of this bias i.e. the size of the bias, caused by the household-
average transformation, as compared to the size of the individual transformation. 
Denote PERC1992 the proportional size of a certain category in the original, 
untransformed dataset of 1992. Then the relative importance of the (individual) 
transformation can be written as ABS(PERC1-PERC1992)/PERC1992. The relative 
importance of the disturbance as a result of using the household-average weights is 
ABS(PERC2-PERC1)/PERC1. Note that the nominator of this variable formed the 
basis for the above figures. Then, for all future years, the average and maximum 
values of both variables can be put in a graph. The sample was then subdivided to age 
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(or one-year age groups) and, next, to household-category LIPRO
24
. For the age-
categories and the future years, the figures are: 
Figure 15: average percentage bias to age groups. 
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Figure 16: maximal bias to age groups. 
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The worrying picture sketched by figure 16 is fortunately countered by the 
preceding figure 15. The maximal bias may not be unimportant, the average bias 
shows that this maximal bias is found in proportionally small age categories. 
 Next, the sample is subdivided to household-categories. For the future years, 
the results are: 
                                                          
24
 The classification to gender was omitted, since it can be expected that the reweighting of the sample 
has only a very limited effect  on the proportional size of these categories. This makes comparison  with 
the bias-effect less relevant 
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Figure 17: average bias to LIPRO-categories. 
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Figure 18: maximal bias to LIPRO-categories. 
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Using the above figures, the conclusion is that the bias is quite small as compared to 
the relative size of the „individual weighting-effect‟. It is remarkable, by the way, that 
this bias seems to be increasing the most in the beginning of the simulation period. 
After that, it reaches a certain maximum and (in the case of the LIPRO-classification) 
even becomes somewhat lower. In general, the decision to consider the bias as being 
limited and therefore to accept the household-average transformations as a point of 
departure for further analyses, seems justified.  
 Before ending this paragraph, let us briefly take a closer look to the bias 
caused by using the consistent household-average transformations instead of the 
inconsistent individual-transformations. In the above figures, the absolute value of this 
bias was taken, since the goal was to decide whether or not  this bias was considered 
small enough to be acceptable or not. Next, let us consider the actual value of this 
bias, so that we can see what categories are overestimated and what categories are 
underestimated, even if these over- and underestimations are limited. For three years 
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(2000, 2025 and  2050) and the same classifications as used above, the actual values 
of the bias are given in the next two figures. 
Figure 19: sample proportion bias to age categories. 
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First of all, the direction and size of the bias is more or less the same for the three 
years under consideration. This holds as well for the household-categorical-bias as 
presented in the figure below. Secondly, as a result of using the consistent household-
average transformations, the middle-aged individuals are somewhat overestimated, at 
the expense of the youngest individuals. A possible explanation for this is that middle-
aged individuals (from 20 to 45 years old) are often in the same  household as children 
under 20. So, if the one category becomes overestimated as a result of  using the 
household-average transitions, the other category must by definition become 
underestimated. But this only explains why there could be an inverse relation between 
the young and middle-aged individuals, in terms of over- or underestimation. 
However, why isn‟t it so that the young individuals are overestimated (and the middle-
aged individuals underestimated)? A possible answer can be found in table 3: over the 
whole range of future years, the growth rate of the proportion of  young is higher (less 
negative) than that of the middle aged individuals. So, relative to each other, the 
proportion of the young individuals increases whereas the proportion of the middle-
aged individuals decrease. Now if the assumption that individuals of these two groups 
are likely to be found in the same households, the use of household-average 
transitions will result in an underestimation of the young individuals and an 
overestimation of individuals belonging to middle age-groups. For older individuals, 
the picture  is less clear-cut: some age-categories (50, 70 and 85-90) and 
underestimated whereas others (65, 80 and 95) are overestimated. Moreover, for the 
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later future years, the underestimations become larger at the expense of the 
overestimations. This weak intertemporal movement  is  most likely caused by old-
aged individuals living in the same  household as young and middle-aged individuals. 
Figure 4 shows clearly that the individually-transformed proportions of retirees grow 
strongly, whereas the proportions of young- and middle-aged decrease. So, if  
household-average transformations are used, the retirees should be gradually more 
underestimated and less overestimated as time goes by. 
Figure 20: sample proportion bias to household-category. 
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In the case of the household-classification (LIPRO) is can be seen that using the 
consistent household-average transformation results in a bias which underestimates 
the children (which is closely related to the underestimation of the young individuals, 
as shown in the above figure), whereas LIPRO-categories 8, 9 and 10 (Cohabiting 
individuals with children, single parents and other cohabiting individuals) are 
somewhat overestimated. Fortunately, the most important categories (singles, married 
individuals with and without children) are nearly unbiased. 
 
2.5. Conclusion. 
 
 In this second chapter, the main characteristics of the static microsimulation 
model STATION have been presented and discussed. The model combines both 
fundamental techniques involved in the static ageing of a dataset:  reweighting and 
uprating. Using exogenous demographic projections, the model reweights the 1992-
dataset, more specifically the age- and household-type distribution. This describes a 
world where the macroeconomic situation is „frozen‟ and where only the demographic 
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situation changes. Of course, this scenario is just an illustration, since it is highly 
unrealistic. To develop more realistic scenarios and establish a link with the time-
series model of the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau,  the technique of uprating is 
used to implement the assumptions which the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau used 
to build their model of the future costs of the Belgian pension system, but for which 
they did not (sufficiently) explore the distributional effects on income. These 
assumptions give way to three scenarios. As opposed to the benchmark-scenario, all 
of these scenarios share the assumption that wages increase by 2.25% per year, in real 
terms. In the first scenario or the scenario of no policy change, it is assumed that 
pension benefits are not linked to this development of wages. This scenario resembles 
the most to the current situation where pension benefits are linked to the rate of 
inflation but not to the wage-rate. The second scenario implements a partial linkage 
between pensions and wages. Finally, the third scenario introduces the so-called 
wage-barrier in the analysis, and assumes an annual increase of this wage-barrier of a 
certain fraction of that of the annual increase of wages. One should however keep in 
mind that these simulation variants all describe the situation, which starts in 1993. 
The past situation is implicitly reflected in the 1992-dataset and can therefore not be 
changed, nor „wiped out‟.  
 After the presentation and discussion of these scenario‟s, this second chapter 
continued with describing some ad-hoc problems involved in static microsimulation, 
and discussed the solutions found to overcome these problems. This study now 
continues with considering the simulation results.  
 
Chapter 3. Simulation results. 
 
3.1. Introduction. 
 
In the first chapter, the problem was defined: it was argued that the ageing of 
the Belgian population could have profound effects on the pension income. Moreover, 
it was argued that „conventional‟ models did only show the development of pension 
income over time,  while ignoring the distributional effect of ageing on pension 
income. In the second chapter, the static microsimulation model  STATION was 
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presented and thoroughly discussed. In this third chapter, let us turn to the 
presentation and discussion of the simulation results. But let us take a small side-step 
and dwell upon the notion of „welfare‟ for a moment. The reason why this is, is 
because the simulation results presented below, are in some way related to „welfare‟. 
The reader who is interested in a theoretical discussion of the matter, is referred to the 
book by Barry (Barry, 1990) whereas the article by Slesnick (Slesnick, 1998) gives an 
overview of the empirical aspects of welfare-measurement. The vast majority of 
studies dedicating to the study of welfare of households, analyses  the effect of prices 
and incomes on consumer‟s surplus. However, due to a large number of theoretical 
and practical problems of which the problem of aggregation over households is just 
one, attention shifted towards the analysis of incomes and expenditures. Expenditures 
are intuitively more closely associated to „welfare‟ than incomes, but incomes require 
less assumptions concerning prices and such, and are within the direct „policy-reach‟ 
of the government, namely via the tax and transfer system. So, income is the point of 
departure of  the analysis: household income, to be exact. The reason why household-
income is chosen over individual income is that the latter is expected to be more 
related to consumption- expenditures of individuals than the former. For example, 
numerous individuals who do not work and earn a labour-income (children, for 
instance, or housewives) do consume out of the income of  income-earners in the 
same household, and therefore gain utility. Moreover, tax- and benefit regimes are 
often more household- than individually-based. However, this poses a certain 
problem, since we can imagine that welfare differences emerge between households of 
different sizes but the same household income. Put differently, if two households earn 
the same income, we can imagine that the level of welfare differs if the one  
household consists of, say, seven individuals whereas the other is an one-individual 
household. Consequently, simply comparing household incomes is not good enough. 
So-called „equivalence-scales‟ must be applied to the household-income, in order to 
increase comparability. Slesnick (1998, p. 2147) defines an equivalence scale as “the 
expenditure, relative to a reference household, necessary to attain [a certain, GD] 
utility level”. Numerous equivalence scales relating subjective welfare to household-
income have been developed. However, in this study, a very simple and (therefore) 
commonly adopted equivalence scale, the so-called EU-scale, is used. This scale gives 
the head of the household a value of 1, other adults a value of .5 and children a value 
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of .3. So, the equivalent household-income of a household consisting of a father, a 
mother and two children is derived by dividing the household-income by 1+.5+.6=2.1. 
From now on, unless stated otherwise, when income is discussed, I mean equivalent 
household income. 
 This chapter starts by showing the development of average total household 
income of various age-groups. First, the average income of those older than 60 is 
compared with the income of younger age groups (younger than 20 and between 20 
and 60). This way, the effect of the uprating process as well as the macroeconomic 
budget equation become highlighted. Next, we will concentrate on the group of 
retirees: the development of average income of this category -subdivided into age-
groups of course, will be discussed.  
 Taking the average income as the notion of welfare is, of course, a rather 
rough analysis, assuming a utilitarian welfare function and a constant marginal utility 
of income (Slesnick, 1998, p. 2109). The distribution of income should be taken into 
account as well, since “the concept of vertical equity is often identified with the notion 
that, all other things equal, more egalitarian distributions are preferred to those that 
are more dispersed”.  This concept of vertical equity will be included in various ways. 
First of all, the intertemporal distribution of relative poverty rates will be presented 
and discussed. Here, the percentage of „poor‟ will be derived, defining one to be poor 
if he is in a household whose income is below half the average household income. 
Implicitly, this incorporates vertical equity, since “a decrease in the dispersion of 
incomes would tend to lower the number of individuals classified as poor” 
(Blackburn, 1998, p. 453). Next, the inequality of income as such will be presented. 
More specifically, I will consider the development of the Theilcoeficient over time 
and given the four simulation variants under consideration, both for the population as 
a whole and for subgroups.   
 Up to then, only partial measures of welfare will have been introduced. Either 
we will have discussed the average income or the distribution of the average income 
around the mean. Of course, this is a simplification of the facts, since there most  
likely will be some sort of  trade-off between level and inequality. In the second part 
of this simulation results-section,. Based on a welfare function developed by Sen, 
which explicitly introduces this trade-off between income-level and inequality, 
Kakwani (Kakwani, 1986, p. 212-213) developed additive welfare functions for 
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subgroups, using a subjective notion of „envy‟. This section will end by presenting 
and discussing the intertemporal development of this last variable for retirees and non-
retirees.  
 As said, let us start by comparing the development of  total equivalent 
household-income, as averaged over individuals, over time. First of all, let us consider 
the development of income if there is no macroeconomic identity incorporating the 
PAYG-element of pensions. By doing so, we get a chance to see the impact of the 
above-discussed uprating-equation on income. 
Figure 21: development of average income, no indexation, no wage-barrier, no macroeconomic 
PAYG-identity. 
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Remember that the assumption is that wages increase by 2.25% per year, whereas the 
incomes of the retirees are not adjusted (in real terms, that is). This is why the income 
of the retirees gradually lags behind the incomes of the non-retirees. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that the average income of the retirees increases as well, since the average 
pension base of new pensioners increases over time. Next, what happens when the 
PAYG-budget identity is included? Before considering the effect on the average 
income, let us consider the effect of the income of the retirees on the income of the 
non-retirees. 
Figure 22: effect of the income of the retirees on the income of the non-retirees. 
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In order to let the incomes of the non-retirees take the contributions necessary to 
provide the increasing total income-mass of the retirees i.e. the inclusion of the 
PAYG-budget equation, the incomes of the non-retirees must be divided by the above 
ratio.  As a result of both demographic ageing and uprating and given the simulation 
variant where there is no indexation and no wage-barrier, the income-mass of the 
retirees as a fraction of the income-mass of the non-retirees will increase with at most 
48% in 2035. Taking this into account, the development of the average incomes of the 
three age-categories under consideration is shown in figure 23. 
Figure 23: average total income (no index, no wage-barrier) 
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Up to about 2010, the same pattern as in figure 20 emerges. But then ageing really 
kicks in, causing the average incomes of the non-retirees to decrease relative to its 
development in figure 20. The incomes of the retirees and non-retirees to some extent 
converge up to 2035. After that, the situation normalises in the sense that the incomes 
slowly diverge again. In other words, even if the incomes of the non-retirees growth 
by 2.25% per year whereas the incomes of the non-retirees remain constant (in real 
terms), then the diverging effect this has on the incomes of the retirees and non-
retirees is between 2010 and 2035 partially neutralised by the negative effect of the 
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increasing costs of ageing on the incomes of the non-retirees. Next, let us consider 
what happens if the pension benefits of the pensioners become indexed (variant 2), if 
the wage which forms the basis of the future pension benefit becomes limited (variant 
3) and  both (variant 4). It can be seen from figure 22 that variant 2 results in an 
increase of the cost of the pension-system for the non-retirees (up to 8.6%-points in 
2035), whereas the imposition of the wage-barrier results in a relative decrease of this 
cost (up to 7.3%-points). As a result of the joint implementation of both measures, the 
cost of pensions will more or less remain the same (a maximal increase of  .86% in 
2035) relative to the situation where there is no linkage and no wage-barrier. These 
policy measures clearly show the trade-off between the income of the retirees and 
non-retirees. Instead of simply presenting the average incomes for the three age-
categories in different figures, which would all be very much alike and therefore quite 
uninformative, let us evaluate the effect of these measures in terms of Pareto-
optimality. A situation is said to be Pareto-optimal if  it is not possible to increase the 
utility of one individual or group of individuals without decreasing the utility of 
another individual or group of individuals. This definition has been made operational 
using compensation mechanisms. So, we have to consider whether or not the gainers 
from a certain measure could compensate the losers in terms of utility, where utility is 
again represented by average income. Let us ignore the youngest age-category, as their 
„behaviour‟ in terms of changing average income as a result of the policy measures is 
about the same as that of the category aged between 20 and 64. Then, the percentage-
point difference between the growth rate of the average income of the winners and 
that of the losers of each simulation variant, is given in figure 24. 
Figure 24: Pareto-efficiency of policy measures 
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As figure 24 clearly shows, neither the partial or combined implementation of the 
(partial) linkage of the pension benefit and the (partially-linked) wage-barrier is a 
Pareto-improvement
25
. But what does this tell us? Not very much, unfortunately: only 
that the average income of one category decreases more than that the  average income 
of the other category increases. It does not say anything about who the winners and 
losers are, nor does it say anything about how rich, respectively poor these categories 
will be after the implementation of these measures. This is why the joint 
implementation of both measures results in a higher diversion from the Pareto-optimal 
situation as compared to the situation where only the pension benefit is linked to the 
development of wages. At first, this is awkward, since the implementation of the 
wage-barrier decreases the loss of the non-retirees while simultaneously decreasing 
the gain of the retirees. This is true, but we are not considering the direction of the 
losses or gains,  but only their relative magnitude. In fact, the decrease of the loss of 
the non-retirees is smaller than the decrease of the gain of the retirees causing the 
balance to be lower
26
. So, what can we tell about the joint implementation of more 
than one policy measure, versus the effect of implementing one of these measures? 
Not much, not to mention „nothing at all‟. To make things worse, if the winners and 
losers change places „along the way‟27, what conclusions are there left to draw? This 
is one of the reasons why this kind of analysis is not very useful. However, when we 
stick to the partial or one-at-a-time implementation of the linkage, respectively the 
wage-barrier, and if we assume a constant marginal utility of income while ignoring 
the effect of the distribution of income on welfare, we can conclude that the losses 
outweigh the gains. 
                                                          
25
 Note that the „winners‟ and „losers‟ are not always the same,  of course: if  the wage-barrier  is 
implemented, the non-retirees are the winners ((n,y)vs(n,n)) whereas the situation is reversed in the case 
of the partial linkage of the pension benefit ((y,n)vs(n,n)). However, in either cases, the gain of the 
winner does not compensate the loss of the loser. 
26
 Giving a numerical  example might clearify this. In the case of only the partial linkage of the pension-
income to the course of wages, the 2010-gain for the retirees is 3,25%, whereas the loss for the non-
retirees is about 5,25%. The balance is therefore -2%-points. When both the partial linkage and the 
wage-barrier are implemented, the loss of the non-retirees decreases to  4,25% whereas the gain of the 
retirees decreases to 1,7% -a considerably higher number. So, the balance becomes about -2,55%. 
27
 which is in fact the case in the case of the joint implementation of the partial linkage and the wage-
barrier: at first the eldely are the winners, as the effect of the wage-barrier becomes stronger only 
gradually. But after 2030, the situation is reversed. This will be shown later, in figure 27. 
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 Next, let us consider the same average household data, but then with another 
categorisation of age. In figure 25, the development of income of the retirees is 
highlighted.  
Figure 25: average total income (no link, no wage-barrier) 
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Figure 25 again shows the pattern which emerged in figure 23 as well. At first, the 
incomes of the non-retired diverge from that of the retired. Then, from about 2010 on, 
the growth of the incomes of the non-retirees slows down, resulting in a convergence 
of the income of the non-retirees and the retirees. However, the average equivalent 
household-income of the young retirees becomes higher than that of the old non-
retirees from 2020 on. This turns out to be persistent and quite strong since the 
diverging process which sets in from 2035,  and which was shown in figure 23 as 
well, is not strong enough to restore the old situation. Why this is so, becomes 
immediately clear by noticing that we are dealing with net incomes here. The 
assumption of a 2.25% growth rate was based on a expected growth rate of the 
economy as a whole and therefore applied on gross incomes. If the value of  changes 
for some reason, the net income of the non-retirees will decrease relative to the gross 
income. But as retirees do not pay pension-contributions (only sickness- and disability 
benefit, which is assumed to be constant), their income is not adjusted downwards. As 
a result, it is possible that the net income of somebody who retires, increases since he 
or she does no longer have to contribute to the pension system. The reason why the 
average income decreases as the age-category of the head increases, is closely related 
to the upgrading processes as described in the third chapter. For any future (or current)  
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year, the older a pension beneficiary is, the more his or hers pension benefit has been 
following the course of wages, relative to older age-categories.  
 Next, let us consider what happens if we apply the three scenarios as described 
in chapter 3. Remember that the base-variant was the situation where ongoing pension 
benefits are not linked to the wage-rate, whereas wages increased by 2.25% per year. 
Moreover, the wage-barrier is assumed to increase at the same speed as the wage-rate 
which in this case is equivalent to saying that the wage-barrier is linked to the rate of 
inflation, or that there is no wage-barrier at all (since the model is in real terms). As 
shown in table 1, if we describe each variant with two letters, this base-variant is 
described by (n,n): no linkage to the wage-rate and no wage-barrier. In the second 
variant,  we follow  the Federal Planning Bureau in assuming a partial linkage 
between the course of wages and the course of the pension benefit. In fact, we assume 
that ongoing pension benefits (that is, pension benefits of individuals who are retired) 
increase by 1% per year. Again, there is no  wage-barrier. To summarise,  this second 
variant is described by (y,n). For the third variant, we assume no linkage -as in the 
first variant- but this time with an assumed annual increase of the wage-barrier of 1% 
per year (n,y). Lastly, it is both assumed that pension benefits are linked to the wage-
rate, and that the wage-barrier increases by 1% per year (y,y). Having recapitulated the 
simulation variants, let us consider the effect on the average pension benefit,  
expressed as a fraction of the (n,n)-pension benefits. First of all, what is the effect of 
linking the income of the retirees to the development of (gross) wages of the non-
retirees? This is shown in figure 26 where the relative figures are presented. 
Figure 26: the effect of a partial linkage on average total income. 
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Clearly, introducing the linkage of the incomes of the retirees to the development of 
gross wages is the most beneficiary to the oldest category of retirees. When discussing 
 65 
the simulation results of the (n,n)-scenario, we argued that the lower income of the 
oldest category of beneficiaries was caused by the fact that the older a beneficiary is, 
the more his or her pension benefit lags behind the current level of wages. Partially 
linking the pension income of the retirees to the wage-rate prevents this lagging 
behind and it is therefore clear that the age-category for which this lagging was the 
strongest -the oldest age-category- benefits the most.  
Another remarkable thing is that the effect of this partial linkage is the 
strongest for the earlier simulation years. This effect is not caused by the uprating 
mechanism itself. To see why this is so, let us rewrite the uprating equation presented 
earlier. As before, denote y the future year and a the age of the individual in the future 
year y. Moreover, denote x=y-1992 and age=a-x. Then the upgrading equation in the 
case that the ongoing pensions are increased by 1.% per year can be rewritten as 
(1.0225)
x 
 for a<65 and (1.0225)
max[0,65-age]
  (1.01)max[0,x-max[0,65-age]] for a65. This is 
the second- or (y,n)-variant in paragraph 2.3. If, on the other hand, there is no partial 
indexation of the pension benefit to the course of wages, the upgrading equation 
becomes (1.0225)
x 
 for a<65 and (1.0225)
max[0,65-age]
  (1.00)max[0,x-max[0,65-age]] for 
a65. Denote this the (n,n)- or the benchmark-variant,  as presented in paragraph 2.3. 
The above figure shows the relative effect of partially indexing the pension benefit for 
different age-categories. This can be written as R= (y,n)/(n,n). Write this out to see 
that R=1 for a<65. For a65, R can be written as R=((1.01)max[0,x-max[0,65-age]])/ 
((1.00)
max[0,x-max[0,65-age]]
). Rewrite to R=((1.01)
max[0,x-max[0,65-age]]
)/(1.00) or  
((1.01)
max[0,x-max[0,65-age]]
). So, the marginal effect of x on R is log(1.01)=.004. At first 
sight,  this is somewhat awkward, since a constant marginal effect implies that the 
income of the retirees in the case of a partial linkage should increase at a constant 
speed,  relative to the pension income in the case of no linkage, ceteris paribus. 
However, this ceteris paribus clause is not met, since the microsimulation model 
causes the population to change with respect to the variable age. Especially in the first 
simulation years, the relative weight of older individuals increases as a result of 
ageing. As said before, the older the individual  is, the more he or she gains from 
indexing. So, R is higher for older individuals. If the relative proportion of older 
individuals increases within an age-category as a result of ageing, the „average R‟ for 
that age category increases, which is what we see in the above figure. 
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As said earlier in  this study, the speed of ageing is the highest in the early 
simulation years: from about 2020 onwards, the relative proportion of the oldest 
individuals will decrease again (especially in the oldest age-category). As a result, the 
average R will decrease again, meaning that the effect of the uprating process will 
stabilise. This also explains why the relative effect of the partial linkage stabilises 
earlier for the younger age-categories of retirees. For the category between 65 and 70, 
the effect stabilises quite early in the simulation period, namely around 1995. For the 
other age-categories, this turning points respectively are 2000 and 2015. This is 
because there is not only a shift within the age-categories, but also between the age-
categories: if we abstract from the static nature of the model for a moment, we could 
say that individuals transit from an age-category to a higher age-category. So, 
ultimately, the effect of the linkage shifts to the oldest age-category. 
 We have not yet discussed the effect of the partial linkage on the incomes of 
the non-retirees: the fact that the net incomes of the non-retirees decrease as a result of 
the introduction of the partial linkage, is not unexpected, of course. What is 
interesting, though, is that the above figure indirectly supports the notion that this 
policy measure is not Pareto-optimal. Of course, the gain of the oldest-age category is 
larger than the loss of the non-retirees, but this category of retirees is small. If we take 
into account that the vast majority of retirees are younger than 75, it immediately 
becomes clear that the gains do not outweigh the losses. 
 Next, we consider the (n,y)-variant, where there is no linkage, but where a 
wage-barrier is introduced instead. The simulation results are shown in figure 27.   
Figure 27: the effect of a wage-barrier on average total income. 
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The fact that the incomes of the retirees are lower than in the case of the (n,n)-scenario 
is a direct result of the introduction of the wage-barrier, which limits the pension 
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benefits of the highest-earners to 1% per year, whereas the (gross) incomes of the non-
retirees increase with 2.25% per year. So, the effect of introducing the wage-barrier 
becomes stronger over time. The fact that the incomes of the retirees gradually 
decrease, implies of course that the incomes of the non-retirees increase as they doe 
not have to contribute as much to the income of the retirees as they should have in the 
case of no wage-barrier. Note that the negative effect is the strongest for the youngest 
retirees. The reason lies in the fact that the gross wages of the non-retirees decrease by 
2.25% per year, whereas the wage-barrier increases by 1% per year. This means that 
the wage-barrier decreases in relative terms. So, the further in the future we get, the 
more individuals will see the wage-barrier influence their pension benefit. This means 
that, given a certain future point in time, a larger proportion of the young retirees will 
have encountered the wage-barrier than compared to the older retirees. 
 Finally, the development of income of the various age-categories in the case of 
the simultaneous introduction of the partial linkage between wages and pensions, the 
(y,y)-variant, is given in figure 28 below. 
Figure 28: the effect of a partial linkage and a wage-barrier on average total income. 
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The implementation of the wage-barrier causes a relative increase of the income of the 
retirees, whereas the wage-barrier results in a decrease of their incomes. Of course, via 
the macroeconomic PAYG-equation, the income-development of the non-retirees is 
the reverse of that of the retirees. The joint  implementation of  both measures 
therefore has an ambiguous effect (see footnote 26). Here, an interesting pattern 
emerges: the effect of the wage-barrier on the income of the retirees emerges only 
slowly, as it takes effect when today‟s non-retirees reach the retirement age. The 
partial linkage of the income of the retirees to the incomes of the non-retirees 
immediately takes effect. So, in the short run, the same pattern as shown in figure 26 
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emerges: the incomes of the retirees increase, where the oldest age-categories gain the 
most, whereas the incomes of the non-retirees decrease. However, from about 2015 
on, the situation changes. Ageing has lost its momentum, and the effect of the wage-
barrier has gradually become stronger. As a result, the incomes of the retirees start to 
decrease again. The incomes of the non-retirees eventually even increase relative to 
their 1992-level.  
 When discussing the effect of the partial linkage of the incomes of the retirees 
to the incomes of the non-retirees, it was argued that the reason why the positive effect 
of this linkage on the average income of the age-category reaches its maximum (i.e. 
the year from which it remains more or less constant) later in the simulation period if 
the age-category is older: this was because ageing causes not only the oldest-age 
category to gain importance relative to the other age-categories, but also by the fact 
that the average age increases within each age-category. Moreover, when discussing 
the partial effect of the wage-barrier, we concluded that the negative effect of this 
barrier is the strongest for the youngest category of retirees. The combination of both 
measures therefore results in a relative shift of income from the non-retirees and the 
young retirees to the old retirees. For the last 15 years of the simulation period, the 
wage-barrier will have gained so much strength, that the contributions which the non-
retirees make will have decreased relative to their 1992-level. From this year on, the 
non-retirees and oldest category of retirees will gain at the expense of the other two 
categories of retirees. Note again that the relative differences with the 1992-level (i.e. 
100) roughly supports the conclusion that these measures are not Pareto-efficient, as 
the losses of the losers do outweigh the gains of the winners. 
 Up to now, we have implicitly assumed that the welfare of (subcategories of) 
retirees was reflected by the development of average income. Of course, as was 
explained in the introduction of this chapter, this is a simplification. We will now 
include the distribution of income in our analysis. At first, this will be done only 
indirectly, since the subjective poverty rates are to be considered. This is one of the 
things for which the microsimulation model was developed in the first place. As said 
in the introduction of this chapter, a  rather crude but widely-accepted objective 
definition of poverty is used: a household is considered „poor‟ if its equivalent income 
is lower than 50% of the average equivalent income. So, households are poor relative 
to other households in the dataset. One should keep this in mind when considering the 
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effects of potential policy measures on poverty. As Heinrich points out, whether 
poverty is defined in the relative or absolute sense, has important policy implications, 
since “absolute poverty is eliminated by making everybody better off i.e. by shifting 
the income distribution upwards. Relative poverty, on the other hand, is eliminated by 
redistributing income from the rich to the poor” (Heinrich, 1998, p.6). As we are 
primarily interested in the income position of the retirees, we will devote  the most 
attention to this category of individuals in the dataset
28
.  
Let us start by considering the development of poverty of four age-categories, where 
the retirees are again opposed to several categories of non-retirees. 
Figure 27:  poverty rates (no partial linkage, no wage-barrier). 
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To a certain extend, the development of poverty can be explained by looking back at 
the figure 25, and roughly comparing the development of income  of the non-retirees 
with that of the retirees. Clearly, as a result of the fact that the incomes of the retirees 
and the non-retirees diverge over time, the proportion of retirees considered to be poor 
will increase dramatically up to about 25% in 2010. After that, as explained when 
discussing figure 25, the cost of ageing cause the incomes of the retirees and non-
retirees to converge again, in the sense that the incomes of the non-retirees decrease 
relative to the incomes of the retirees. Consequently, the proportion of poor retirees 
decreases again whereas the proportions of poor non-retirees increase. Of course, this 
                                                          
28
 A short note must be devoted to the recent development of combining bootstrapping techniques with 
poverty analysis. (see, for instance, Heinrich, 1998 and Osberg&Xu, 1997). Poverty analysis is 
generally based on sample information, which means that there is vulnerability to sample bias and such. 
One of the solutions to this problem which is gaining popularity due to its generality, its distribution-
independence and the technical-simplicity is bootstrapping. However, we will not use this technique in 
this model. The reason is that de development of poverty for all simulation years is based on the same 
sample, which means that the comparison of the poverty rates are not shaded by sampling errors. 
 70 
latter development is much less strong as the former, since the category of non-retirees 
is bigger than that of the retirees, in terms of individuals. 
How does poverty changes if the simulation variants are taken into account? Let us 
start by comparing sample-wide poverty rates given the four simulation variants. 
Figure 30: general poverty rates for the simulation variants. 
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Two major effects immediately become clear in figure 30: first of all, partially linking 
the income of the retirees to that of the non-retirees strongly reduces the general 
poverty rate, especially in the first half of the simulation period. This difference is at 
most 2,25%-point or 39% in 2015. Secondly, the partial implementation of a wage-
barrier has only a very small and ignorable effect on poverty. The explanation of the 
former effect is simple: partially linking the income of the retirees to that of the non-
retirees neutralises the divergence-process and therefore reduces poverty. Of course, 
the implementation of the wage-barrier reduces the income of the retirees, but the 
incomes which are affected by this measures are those of the richest retirees. 
Therefore, this measure has only a small effect in the determination of the average 
income, and therefore on the poverty line. Moreover, this negative effect is partly 
neutralised by the positive effect of this measure on the incomes of the non-retirees.  
Of course, one could argue that this is also the case for the (y,n)-variant, where the 
partial linkage is implemented. In this case, the positive effect on the income of the 
retirees is opposed by the negative effect on the income of the non-retirees. This is 
true indeed, but figure 24 shows that this neutralising effect is much weaker than in 
the case of the (n,y)-variant. So, if this line of reasoning is true, then the age-specific 
poverty rates should change as a result of implementing the wage-barrier. However, as 
compared to the changes when the partial linkage is introduced, these changes should 
more or less cancel each other out. We will consider later if this is so. 
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Of course, the next step is considering how the poverty rates of the various age-
categories change as a result of the simulation variants. First of all, figure 31 shows 
the age-specific poverty rates in the case of the (y,n)-variant, i.e. when the incomes of 
the retirees are partially linked to the incomes of the non-retirees. 
Figure 31: the effect of a partial linkage on poverty rates. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
5
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
5
2
0
2
0
2
0
2
5
2
0
3
0
2
0
3
5
2
0
4
0
2
0
4
5
2
0
5
0
year
%
-d
if
fe
re
n
c
e
age=<20 20<age<55 55<age<65 65>=age
 
As could be expected, the introduction of a partial linkage between the incomes of the 
retirees and those of the non-retirees results in a sharp decrease of the poverty among 
the retirees. Eventually, the poverty rate of this category even goes down to 50%-point 
of its value in the base-variant! This is a combined effect of the relative increase of the 
income of  the retirees and the relative decrease of the income of the non-retirees. As 
the poverty rate is based on the population-wide average income, we have a zero-sum 
situation in the sense that a decrease of the poverty of a certain category must be 
accompanied by an increase of the poverty of one or more other categories. Moreover, 
the PAYG-equation 5 guarantees that the extra money which is involved in the 
linkage of the pension income to the course of wages, is paid for by the non-retirees. 
This is confirmed by the data: the poverty rates for the other categories increase 
slowly. For the households for which the head is 55 or younger, poverty ends up a bit 
less than 18%-point higher than in the base-variant at the end of the simulation period.  
Next, let us consider the effect of implementing the wage-barrier on poverty rates. 
This is shown in figure 32. 
Figure 32: the effect of the wage-barrier on poverty rates. 
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The effect of the implementation of the wage-barrier has is opposite to the effect to 
the effect of the partial linkage: in this case, the poverty among the non-retirees 
decreases whereas poverty among the retirees increases. This last effect is puzzling 
and goes against our intuition, for we would expect that a policy measure which has a 
limiting effect on the highest incomes of the retirees to have a poverty-decreasing 
effect. This would be true if the poverty line would have been one-half  of the average 
income of the retirees. But it is not: the poverty line is based on the sample-wide 
average income.  The increasing poverty among retirees turns out to be an artificial 
effect of changing average incomes. On the one hand, the average income of the 
retirees decreases. However, on the other hand, the average income of the sample as a 
whole decreases as well, but the decrease of the latter is less strong than that of the 
former. The result is that the average income of the retirees decreases relative to the 
sample-wide average, thereby causing poverty rates of the retirees to increase. Finally, 
note that the changes of these age-specific poverty rates indeed roughly cancel each 
other out.  
Next, we turn to the distribution of income of the retirees. The Theil-
coefficient  T of the (equivalent) pension income is written as follows: 
T
n
y
y
y
y
i
i
n
i








1
1
log , where n is the sample size and yi is the income of individual i ( 
Cowell, 1995, p. 49) The value of the Theil-coefficient ranges between zero (in the 
case of complete equality of incomes) and log(n). Firstly, the future development of 
the sample-wide inequality of total income for the various simulation variants will be 
presented and discussed. Next, the within-group inequality for retirees and non-
retirees will be presented separately, for the various simulation variants. 
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 The effect of the various simulation variants on the sample-wide income 
inequality is given in the following figure 33. 
Figure 33: sample-wide income inequality. 
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The Theilcoefficient is 0,0827 in the base-year 1992 and increases gradually up to 
about 0,1 in 2035 (base-variant). From then on, inequality remains stable. In the 
context of static microsimulation, this increase up to 2035 is closely related to the fact 
that older retirees (whose pension incomes are more widely distributed) get a higher 
weight in the calculation of the Theilcoefficient. It is however hard to establish a 
causal link: is it the decrease of income inequality over time in the past (for instance 
as a result of the social security system being extended), which causes the income 
inequality of younger age-groups to be lower than that of older age-groups and 
consequently of an increase of the income  inequality as the older age-groups get a 
higher weight in the simulation process? Or is the opposite the case, and is it actually 
the case that pension income for all age-groups (including the retirees) has become 
more unequally distributed in  the past, and in the future as well. The answer is hard to 
find, since it requires long-term information on past income inequality, which does 
not exists to my knowledge. The only information we found supports the second line 
of reasoning, and is that the income inequality for both the active population and 
retirees has been increasing between 1985 and 1992 (Cantillon, et. al., 1993, table 8 p. 
13). Another possible explanation for the increasing inequality between 1992 and 
2010 is not that the weight of the retirees in the calculation of the sample-wide 
inequality increases,  but that the weights remain roughly the same whereas the 
income inequality within the group of retirees increases as a result of the uprating 
process. Which one of these above explanations is „more true‟ than the other, will 
only become clear when looking at the within-group inequalities of retirees and non-
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retirees. This will be done below. For now, let us leave this, and consider the effect of 
either indexing the pension benefit and/or implementing the wage-barrier on the 
dispersion of pension income. The change of the income inequality as a result of the 
two partial simulation variants is given in figure 34.  
Figure 34: effect of the partial linkage and the wage-barrier on income inequality. 
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If we ignore the income-side of the model for a moment, we can a priori expect the 
linkage of  the pension benefit to the course of wages to result in a lower income 
inequality, since the process of diverging average incomes is partly neutralised by this 
mechanism. This is clearly shown in figure 34: as a result of the partial linkage, 
income inequality decreases with at most 7,6%-point in 2010. However, as a result of 
the macroeconomic PAYG-identity, we know from figure 26 that the net incomes 
(which we are dealing with here) of the non-retirees grow at a lower speed than 
2.25%. We saw in figure 26 that, in the long run, the average net income-level of the 
oldest category of non-retirees (which contribute to the system) becomes lower than 
that of two of three age-categories of retirees. Consequently, the inequality-decreasing 
effect of the partial linkage between the incomes of  the retirees and the non-retirees 
will gradually become smaller in the long run. Again, this is shown in figure 34. 
What is the a priori effect of the implementation of the wage-barrier to the 
dispersion of incomes? Earlier, on page 31, we concluded that the effect of the 
implementation of the wage-barrier to the dispersion of pension incomes was a priori 
ambiguous. However, we reasoned that the most likely effect would be a slow 
decrease of inequality at first, which would turn into an increase of inequality in the 
very long run. This is confirmed by the above figure: the ambiguity of this effect is 
reflected by its short-term weakness, as compared to the effect of the partial linkage. 
However, in the longer run, the positive effect on income inequality is very strong. At 
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the end of the simulation period, this strong equalising effect is gradually -but not 
fully- neutralised, which also confirms our expectations. 
Next, let us compare the development of income inequality of the retirees and 
the non-retirees. An important advantage of the Theilcoefficient is that it can easily be 
decomposed in within-group inequality and between-group inequality (i.e. within - 
and between the retirees and non-retirees). Let us start by considering the within-
group inequalities. Figure 35 shows the within group-inequality of the retirees and the 
non-retirees together with the sample-wide income inequality in the case of no policy-
measures.  
Figure 35: within-group- and sample-wide inequality: (n,n)-variant. 
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The development of sample-wide income-inequality can for a large extent (but not 
fully) be explained by looking at the within-group income inequalities. When 
considering figure 35, the first interesting thing is that the within-group income 
inequality of the group of retirees is higher than that of the non-retirees. This was 
already mentioned when discussing the sample-wide income inequalities in figure 33. 
Two possible reasons for the increase of the sample-wide income inequality where 
given when discussing figure 33. Both the increase of the weight of the retirees as 
compared to the weight of the non-retirees, as well as the increase of the within-group 
inequality of the retirees were possible causes for the increase of the sample-wide 
income inequality. Figure 35 suggests -but only suggests, since any more definitive 
conclusions can not be drawn- that it is merely the increase of the within-group 
inequality of the retirees which causes the sample-wide inequality to increase.  
 The next logical step is to consider how the within-group inequalities change 
as a result of implementing the partial linkage, the wage-barrier, or both. Again, the 
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figures are expressed in percentage-changes. Figure 36 shows the effect of 
implementing the partial linkage. 
Figure 36: the effect of partially linking the pension benefit to the course of wages.  
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First of all, note that the introduction of the partial linkage between the income of the 
retirees and non-retirees does not have any effect on the income inequality of the non-
retirees, since they are assumed to contribute the same extra amount of money to 
cover the cost of the partial-linkage. However, there are some retirees which are 
younger than 65 and whose pension income increases relative to the base-variant 
while they do not pay the extra contribution. So, for the category individuals younger 
than the retirement age, some individuals (the early-retired) get more while others (the 
non-retired) get less. As a result, income inequality goes up. By contrast and in line 
with earlier explanations, the inequality-decreasing effect of the partial linkage on the 
incomes of the retirees is very important and even going up to 13,9% in 2050.  
 The effect of the introduction of a partially-linked wage-barrier is shown in 
figure 37.  
Figure 37: effect of the wage-barrier on inequality of income. 
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As a result of the introduction of the partially-linked wage-barrier, both the within-
group inequalities as the between-group inequality decreases. What is interesting is 
that the inequality of the elderly (i.e. the retirees older than 65) seem to decrease less 
strong than the inequality of the retirees younger than the retirement age. A possible 
explanation could be that this last group of retirees generally has a higher (pension) 
income than the group of retirees older than the retirement age.  
 Lastly, figure 38 shows the combined effect of partially linking the wage-
barrier as well as the pension-benefit to the course of wages on the sample-wide 
income inequality. 
figure 38: joint implementation of the partially-linked wage-barrier and the partial linkage of 
pension benefit to the course of wages. 
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For both age-categories within the whole sample, the within-group inequality of 
income decreases, a development which of course can be explained by looking back at 
figures 36 and 37. This is especially the case for the main category of pension-
beneficiaries, namely those older than the retirement age. For this category both 
partial effects point in the same direction, so the result of the joint implementation of 
the wage-barrier and the partial linkage of the pension benefit to the course of wages 
is unambiguously a decrease of the within-group inequality. This is also the case for 
the within-group inequality of the retirees younger than the retirement age. But we are 
considering all individuals, and the inequality of all individuals younger than the 
retirement age increases due to the increase of the contribution rate. This is the first 
effect. The second effect is the implementation of the wage-barrier and this results 
again in a decrease of inequality. It turns out that this second effect  is stronger than 
the first effect. One can expect that those individuals who retire early receive a 
pension based on a relatively high wage, so that the implementation of  the wage-
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barrier will have an important impact. Moreover, the years that individuals actually 
are early retired, are limited. Consequently, the effect of the imposition of the partial 
linkage of the pension benefit to the course of wages remains limited for pension 
beneficiaries younger than the retirement age. 
 So far, some rather simple and partial measures of wealth have been presented 
and discussed. But the simulation results of STATION allow for more complex 
analysis as well. As an example, let us consider a somewhat more advanced notion of 
wealth. Based on work by Dagum, Kakwani (Kakwani, 1986, p. 212-213) developed 
additive welfare functions for subgroups, using a subjective notion of „envy‟. Indeed, 
the wealth of a household is to a certain extent determined by the incomes of other 
households.  In fact, this measure was explicitly developed to measure wealth 
disparities between to groups and bases on the idea that the wealth of households in 
one group is determined by comparison with the wealth of households in the other 
group
29
. Depart from the following notion of envy, represented by the variable k. 
 g(x,y) = x if x  y 
  = x - k(y-x) if y > x 
 
So, “if the individual finds that the compared incomes [y,GD] are lower than his, then 
his welfare is given by his own income x. If, on the other hand, the compared incomes 
selected are higher than his, then the individual feels envious and loses welfare [...] 
proportional to the differences in  incomes” (Kakwani, 1986, p. 198). The exogenous 
variable k denotes the impact of this income comparison on wealth: it can therefore be 
seen as the “parameter of envy”. In what follows, let us apply the above, but then for 
those younger than 65 versus the individuals of 65 and older. Denote g the index 
number of the group, so that g=1 for the group of individuals younger than 65. 
Furthermore, denote ag the proportion of individuals, g the mean income, and Gg the 
Gini index of income distribution in group g. Moreover, define j as representing the 
„other‟ group. So, if g=1 then j=2 and vice versa. Then the wealth Wg can be written as 
 W k a G A
a
ag g g g g
g
j j g    








   
2
1
2
 
Equation 6 
                                                          
29
 Kakwani used this measure to consider the wealth difference between men and women. So, in this 
context, the wealth of a man was to a certain extent caused by the income of women.  
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 where A = G-a1
21G1- a2
22G2 and  and G are of course sample-wide values. 
Moreover, total wealth W can be written as the weighted sum of the wealth of the two 
groups: W=a1W1+ a2W2. However, this last variable W is not very interesting. What is 
of interest is the welfare-disparity as measured by the ratio of welfare of the two 
groups. The following figure 39 shows the development of the ratio of the Kakwani-
index of wealth for the households of which the head is 65 years of older and that of 
the households of which the head is younger than 65. 
Figure 39: Kakwani-wealth ratio with the envy-variable k=0.5. 
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The initial value of the wealth ratio is .75 in the starting year 1992. Put differently, the 
wealth of the elderly is lower than the wealth of the non-elderly. Why is this? Simply 
because the elderly have more reason to be envious in the sense that the average 
income of the elderly is lower than that of the non-elderly. For the first period, the 
Kakwani-wealth ratio decreases to about .715 in the case of the base-variant. From 
then on, an increase sets in, resulting in the ratio reaching its maximum of almost 1 in 
2030. After that, the ratio again decreases to .95 in 2050. As could be expected from 
earlier simulation results, implementing the partial linkage between the pension 
benefit and the course of wages results in a strong increase of the wealth of the elderly 
relative to the wealth of the non-elderly. In fact, relative to the Kakwani-wealth ratio 
in the base-variant, the wealth-ratio in this variant increases up to a factor 1.14 in 
2010, which is when ageing really starts to kick in. After that, this factor remains 
more or less stable. The Kakwani-wealth ratio ends up a factor 1.15 higher than in the 
base-variant in the simulation-year 2050. So, as a result of the partial linkage of the 
pension benefit to the course of wages, the wealth of the elderly increases with 15% 
relative to the wealth of the non-elderly! This is caused by the fact that this linkage 
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does not only increase the incomes of the elderly, but -via higher contributions- also 
decrease the income of the non-elderly. So,  seen from the perspective of the elderly,  
not only do their incomes increase, but the „reference incomes‟  (which the envy is 
based upon) decrease as well. As a result, the wealth of the elderly increases. Of 
course, this is accompanied by a decrease of the wealth of the non-elderly, which 
explains the strong effect on the ratio of the two. It is equally clear that the 
implementation of the wage-barrier will result in a decrease of the Kakwani-wealth 
ratio relative to the base-variant. The reason is that this wage-barrier will limit 
pension-benefits and decrease contributions made by the non-elderly, again all  
relative to the base-variant. So, the wealth of the elderly will decrease whereas the 
wealth of the non-elderly will increase, resulting in a decrease of the above-described 
ratio. This decrease is rather modest for the largest part of the simulation period. In 
2025, the Kakwani-wealth ratio will have decreased to .93  of its value in the base-
variant. From then on, the decrease becomes stronger, resulting in a value being about 
.79 of its original value in 2050.  
Given the above results, it may again come as no surprise that the combined 
effect of both measures on the Kakwani-wealth ratio is limited. Moreover, it is not 
consistent in the sense that the direction of the effect changes over time. At first, the 
joint implementation of both measures results in an increase of the Kakwani-wealth 
ratio relative to its value in the base-variant. This difference reaches a maximum of 
about 9% in 2010. After that, the ratio again decreases and reaches a minimum of .91 
in 2050. It appears that the positive effect of the partial linkage of the pension benefit 
on the wealth ratio comes before the negative effect of  the implementation of the 
wage-barrier. This is in line with what we saw when discussing the effect of both 
measures on the dispersion of income (figure 34), and can be explained by the 
somewhat ambiguous short- and middle-term effect of the wage-barrier on the 
dispersion of income. 
 In the above simulation results, the exogenous parameter of envy k was set 
equal to .5. What would be the effect of increasing or decreasing the enviousness of 
the individuals? In the following figure 40, the simulations for the base-variant where 
again calculated, but then for k being equal to .1 (low envy) and .9 (high envy). 
Figure 40: the effect of the degree of envy on the Kakwani-wealth ratio. 
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It is clear that the Kakwani-wealth ratio decreases as the envy-variable k increases. As 
said, the wealth ratio is below 1 because the wealth of the elderly -whose income is 
lower than that of the non-elderly- forms the numerator of this ratio. As the elderly 
become more envious to the income of the non-elderly, their wealth will by definition 
decrease. The wealth of the non-elderly will however not be affected, or at least not as 
strong as that of the elderly, which follows directly from the equation introducing k.  
 
3.4. Changing the point of view: what would happen if certain measures were not 
taken? 
 
 In the first three sections of this third chapter, it was considered what the 
effects of two policy measures on incomes, poverty, income-inequality and welfare 
would be. These measures were the partial linkage of ongoing pensions to the course 
of wages and the implementation of a partially-linked wage ceiling. The point of 
departure was the situation in which there would be no linkage and no lagging wage-
ceiling. It could be interesting to take the fourth simulation variant (y,y) as the point of 
departure, for it resembles the closest to the „working hypothesis‟ of the Federal 
Planning Agency. This working hypothesis is based on the historical situation in the 
period 1969-1991. However, from about 1981, the wage-ceiling was no longer 
adjusted to the course of wages. So, let us consider the fourth variant, and see what 
happens to the position of the elderly if one or both of the well-known measures is not 
taken. Before doing so,  let us briefly review what happens if both measures are taken. 
The partial linkage of pensions to the course of wages results in an increase of the 
contribution-rates for the non-retired. So, there is increasing redistribution of income 
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from the non-retired to the retired. As a result of maintaining the partially-linked 
wage-ceiling, the highest pension-benefits no longer grow at the same rate as the other 
pension benefits. So, the contribution-rates for the non-retired relatively decrease, and 
there is a certain redistribution from the retired to the non-retired. 
 What would be the result of abolishing the partial-linkage of ongoing pensions 
with the course of wages on poverty? This can be seen from figure 41. 
 
Figure 41: effect on abolishing the partial linkage between wages and pensions on 
poverty. 
 
It is clear that not linking pensions with wages causes important redistribution of 
income from the retired to the non-retired. The contributions of the non-retired 
decreases, with the result that poverty among individuals in this category decreases. 
The poverty among retired of course increases strongly. At most, it increases with 
116% in 2015. It can be seen that the abolishment of the wage-ceiling on poverty are 
less extreme. 
 
Figure 42: effect on abolishing the wage-ceiling on poverty. 
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Figure 42 shows that the abolishment of the wage-ceiling does not have an effect in 
the short run. However, in the long run, it causes poverty among the non-retired to 
increase whereas the poverty among the retired decreases. This is the consequence of 
the fact that this measure causes contributions to decrease relative to their 
development otherwise. So, the abolishment of this measure increases contributions, 
thereby causing income redistribution from the non-retired to the retired.  
 To see what would happen to income inequality if these policy measures 
would not be introduced, it is sufficient to change the directions in figures 35, 36 and 
37. If neither of both measures are implemented, income inequality among both 
retired and non-retired would increase. For the retired, the increase will be drastic: to 
at most 21% in 2030. The inequality among non-retired will increase with at most 6% 
in 2035. Sample-wide income inequality would increase with at most 11% in 2035 as 
well.  
 The effects of abolishing these measures on the Kakwani-wealth ratio are 
shown in figure 43. It is clear that abolishing the partial linkage between wages and 
pensions will result in a decrease of the wealth of elderly relative to non-elderly. This 
decrease will come quite fast, and the wealth of the elderly will in 2010 be 12% below 
its level if the measure would have been implemented. Likewise will not introducing 
the wage-ceiling result in an increase of the wealth of the retired relative to the non-
retired. This effect will only emerge in the long run, but will be considerable. In 2050, 
the wealth of the non-retired would be no less than 26% higher as compared to the 
situation if the measure was actually taken.  
 
Figure 43: effect on abolishing the partial linkage between wages and pensions and/or 
the wage-ceiling on the Kakwani-wealth ratio. 
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Figure 43 shows as well that, if both measures would not have been taken, then the 
wealth of the retired would at  first decrease relative to that of the non-retired, with a 
maximum of a bit more than 9% in 2005. After that, it would increase again, to at 
most 10% in 2050. 
 
Chapter 4: criticisms, discussion and conclusions. 
 
4.1. Criticisms and discussion. 
 
 In the first chapter, the problem definition, as well as need for developing a 
microsimulation model was described. Then, in the  second chapter, the static 
microsimulation model STATION was presented and discussed. The third chapter 
then contained an extensive discussion of the simulation results. Before turning to the 
summary and conclusions of this study, however, it seems useful to reconsider one 
last time the model which has been developed, and to see in which ways it could be 
improved  and -if so and if possible- how this could be done. Along the way, some 
arbitrary decisions had to be made, and it would not seem right not  to highlight these 
as well. Therefore,  in this one-but-last section, some criticisms will be brought 
forward and discussed. One could see at least some of these criticisms as a plea to try 
to solve these problems in the future.  
First of all, why not developing a dynamic microsimulation model instead of a 
static one? After all, the former are more advanced than the latter nowadays, and 
Belgium is one of the few countries in Europe which does not have such a model.  
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That all being true, there still was no reason to develop a dynamic model given the 
current research problem. If it comes to the relative income position of the elderly, or 
inequality and poverty based on annual incomes, most other researchers have chosen 
static models as well (for a more elaborate discussion, see Dekkers, in Becker et.al, 
2000). The reason for this is that the development period for a dynamic model is much 
longer than for a static model. In fact, for just one research problem, the effort of 
developing an entire dynamic model is just not worth wile, both in terms of 
development time and financial sacrifice. Moreover, the development of a dynamic 
model requires the availability of specific data on transition probabilities. It is 
questionable whether much of this data exists or, which is the same in the end, 
whether we could have access to it. 
 A more practical problem involved in the above model concerns the use of 
income. As said in the second chapter, the household income of the individuals forms 
the  point of departure. However, both the transformed weighting variable as well as 
the uprating process is based on individual information, such as age, labour market 
status (retired or not retired) and household-category. Consequently, the resulting 
simulation results are no longer based on a household-income concept which is equal 
for all members of the household. This is not very important as far as the reweighting 
scheme is concerned (as extensively explained in section 2.4.4.), and there were some 
good reasons for it too. However, the choice for an individual upgrading process, and 
thereby allowing the incomes of individuals in the same household to differ over time, 
remains somewhat arbitrary. Either this, or the uprating process for all individuals in a 
household should have been  based on the information of only one individual in that 
household, notably the head of the household. This would have meant that the age 
distribution of other members of the household would have been completely ignored. 
So, the household income of an 50-year old head with a 40-year old wife would have 
been uprated exactly the same way as the household income of a 50-year old head 
with a 50-year old wife. This would ignore an important amount of information. So, a 
subjective choice had to be made, and it was chosen to let the uprating process use 
individual information, thereby „sacrificing‟ the equality of household income for all 
members of the household. The most likely effect of this decision will have been an 
increase of income inequality, however without disturbing the effects of the 
simulation variants. 
 86 
 Another possible criticism again concerns the uprating scheme which the 
model uses is that the macroeconomic environment is very rough and simple. First of 
all, it is not possible to change the growth rate of wages nor the linkage between 
wages and pension benefits along the way, at least not without the model behaving as 
if the new information has been applied from 1992 on. Secondly, past macroeconomic 
changes are not taken into account, at least those which are not already implicitly 
incorporated in the 1992-income distribution. To clarify this, let us consider an 
example. During the sixties, wages rose considerably and these wage-increases have a 
hidden but probably important effect on the current level of pensions. Now if we use 
current uprated pension benefits as a proxy to future pension  benefits, we implicitly 
assume that future retirees will have the same wage-history: their own „sixties‟, so to 
say. Moreover, we assume that the past pension scheme is the same as in the one in 
the future. Of course, this is a problem. However, could one argue, it is a problem 
which all empirical models face. All information underlying any economic model is 
by definition ex post information. For instance, in dynamic microsimulation models, 
future wages are determined by a wage-function, which is estimated on historical 
information. That is true, but in a dynamic microsimulation model, future pensions are 
based on the wage-function, which is estimated using wage-information of 1992. 
However, in a static model, future pensions are based on current (1992-) pensions, 
which are based on much earlier wages, as well as the past development of the 
pension system. So, the „time-lapse‟ is larger in the case of a static model than in the  
case of a dynamic model. This increases the risk that time-specific circumstances 
pollute the simulation results. 
  
4.2. Summary and Conclusions. 
 
It is beyond any doubt that the fact that the Belgian population is ageing causes 
concern for the sustainability of the pension scheme. Numerous models have been 
developed to analyse the relation between ageing and the pension system. The Belgian 
Federal Planning Bureau has developed a model, PENSION, which shows this 
relation. This model includes some assumptions on economic growth, the linkage 
between contributions and benefits and the existence of a pension-ceiling. Whether or 
not the conclusions drawn are valid or not, is not the point of interest here, but the 
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model fails to show the distributional effects of these assumptions. However, when 
taking a decision on which potential measure to adopt, politicians should know about 
the effect of these measures on poverty and income inequality.  
 The static microsimulation model STATION is therefore complementary to 
the model of the Federal Planning Bureau. It is designed to show distributional effects 
of changing demographic circumstances, as well as the uprating of monetary 
variables. The model disentangles four simulation variants. The first one is that there 
is no linkage between the pension benefit and the course of wages and no wage-barrier 
in the determination of the future pension benefit. The second and third simulation 
variants partially adopts the linkage and the wage-barrier, respectively. Lastly, the 
fourth variant adopts both the partial linkage and the wage-barrier. Of course, the 
model is completed with a so-called PAYG-equation, assuring the equality between 
extra benefits and contributions.  
 The first simulation results concern the comparison of average household 
incomes of various categories of households (where the age of the head of the 
household typically is the relevant variable). Figure 24 on page 59 shows that “neither 
the partial or combined implementation of the (partial) linkage of the pension benefit 
and the  (partially-linked) wage-barrier is a Pareto-improvement”. Maybe, but this is 
given a rough utilitarian welfare-concept and moreover ignores the distributional 
effect of  these measures. Figures 26 and 27 show that especially the partial linkage of 
the pension benefit to the course of wages has got a strong effect on average incomes; 
especially that of the oldest retirees increases very considerably. This pattern shows 
for the development of poverty rates as well, as could be expected. Figure 29 shows 
that poverty among the retirees will increase strongly in the first half of the simulation 
period. After 2010, it will decrease again and will converge to the (gradually 
increasing) poverty rate among households of which the head is between 55 and 65. 
The implementation of the wage-barrier clearly has a very limited effect on poverty, 
but figure 31 shows that the effect of the partial linkage of  pensions to the course of 
wages results in a strong decrease of the poverty among the retirees (eventually down 
to 50 percent!) causing the general poverty rate (figure 30), to decrease as well. It may 
come as no surprise that the sample-wide income inequality, represented by a Theil-
index, increases over time, and that both simulation variants have a inequality-
decreasing effect (figure 32). However, first of all, the effect of these measures is less 
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strong than in the case of the poverty rates (though considerable), but more 
importantly and as opposed to what was the case with the poverty rates, the effect of 
the implementation of the wage-barrier now is at least as strong as the effect of 
partially linking the pension benefit to the course of wages. However, it is less 
straightforward, in the sense that it is difficult to say a-priori what the effect of this 
measure on inequality will be. Figure 32 shows that income inequality decreases at 
first, but that this effect does not last. When considering the within-group inequalities, 
the only general conclusion to be drawn is that as a result of both measures, the 
income inequality among households with a head of 65 and older, will decrease 
considerably (see figures 36 and 37). For the other households, the situation is 
ambiguous, but a combined implementation of both measures will result in a lower 
income inequality as well, as figure 38 shows. Lastly, the Kakwani-wealth ratio, 
which defines wealth not only to be a function of ones income, but also a function of 
higher incomes in the „other‟ category. To this goal, an „envy-variable‟ is introduced. 
Figure 39 shows that especially the introduction of the partial linkage of pension 
benefits to the course of wages results in a considerable increase of the wealth ratio, 
meaning that the wealth of the elderly shifts closer to the wealth of the non-elderly. 
Moreover, it shows that the introduction of the wage-barrier will result in a loss of 
welfare of the elderly relative to the young. This of course is not unexpected, since 
this measure will limit the costs of the pension benefits  paid out to the retirees. 
Lastly, figure 40 shows that an increase of the „envy-variable‟ results in a lowering of 
the welfare of the elderly relative to that of the non-elderly. 
 Now what conclusions can there be drawn from this study? First of all, the 
simulation results show that, both poverty and income inequality will increase. An 
important determinant of this is the uprating of income and pensions. Secondly.  the 
impact of the partial linkage of the pension benefit to the course of wages and the 
implementation of the wage-barrier on poverty, income inequality and welfare, is 
quite important. When considering the effect of these measures on poverty among the 
elderly, especially the implementation of the partial linkage between wages and 
pensions has a strong and unambiguous poverty-reducing effect. This reduction in 
poverty is accompanied by a unambiguous decrease of income inequality, which does 
not come as a surprise. The effect of implementing the wage-barrier on poverty rates 
is negative, but much smaller. Moreover, the effect on income inequality was a priori 
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unclear, but turns out negative. So, as a result of the implementation of the wage-
barrier, income inequality decreases as well, though its effect is limited, both in time 
and in magnitude. But that is not all, of course, as a result of the implementation of 
both policy measures, there is an implicit income redistribution: the linkage of the 
pensions to the course of wages causes a redistribution of income from all non-retirees 
to all retirees (via the PAYG-equation). However, the implementation of the wage-
barrier reduces the highest pension benefits which results in a relative decrease of the 
contributions of the non-retired. So, the effect of this measure is an income 
redistribution from rich pensioners to all non-retirees. Combining these measures 
therefore implies a redistribution of income from the non-retired and the rich retirees 
to the non-rich retirees. Even though this might not be Pareto-optimal, it surely seems 
a good thing to do, from the distributional point of view. This is confirmed by the 
Kakwani-wealth ratio depicted in figure 39: both measures to a certain extent 
neutralise each other, so that the costs (and effects of these costs on poverty) are borne 
by those who can carry them.  
 
 90 
Literature 
 
Aaron, H., 1977, Demographic Effects on the Equity of Social Security Benefits, in: 
Feldstein, M., Inman, R.(eds), the Economics of Public Services, MacMillan, New 
York, pp. 151-173. 
 
d‟Alcantara, G., Wardenier, R., 1997, De Socio-professionele Statuten uit de Sociale 
Zekerheid in België, Ministerie van Sociale  Zaken, Volksgezondheid en Leefmilieu, 
Garant, Leuven. 
 
Barry, N., 1990, Welfare, Concepts in Social Thought 1990:1, University of  
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. 
 
Becker, H., 1994, Generaties en hun Kansen, fourth edition, Meulenhoff, Amsterdam. 
 
Bengtsson, T., Kruse, A., 1993, Impacts of Demographic Changes on an Economic 
Growth Sensitive Pension System: the Case of Sweden, Paper presented at the 7
th
 
annual Conference of the European Socity for Population Economics (ESPE), 
Budapest June 3-5, 1993. 
 
Blackburn, M., 1998, The Sensitivity of International Poverty Comparisons, Review of 
Income and Wealth, vol 44, no 4, pp. 449-472. 
 
Bolhuis, E., Vossers, W., 1986, Pensioenfondsen in Nederland, no 38, Centraal 
Planbureau, 1986. 
 
Bos, D. (ed), 1993, Economics in a Changing World: Proceedings of the 10
th
 annual 
world congress of the International Economic Association, Moskow, 1993, Vol. 3. 
 
Boulanger, P., A. Lambert, P. Deboosere and R. Lesthaeghe, 1994, la Formation des 
Familles: étude Prospective, programme de recherche en sciences sociales, service de 
programmation de la politique scientifique.  
 
 91 
Cantillon,  B., Houvenaghel, I., Meulemans, B., 1994, De Pensioenkwestie vanuit 
Verdelingsstandpunt, Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Sociale Zekerheid, 1994, vol. 36, no 3, 
1994, pp. 777-808. 
 
de Callatay, E. , Turtelboom, B. , 1996, Pension Reform in Belgium, IMF working 
paper WP/96/74 July, p.32.  
 
Cantillon, B., Marx, I., Proost, D., Van Dam, R., 1993, Sociale Indicatoren, CSB-
berichten D/1993/6104/10, Centrum voor Sociaal Beleid, Universiteit Antwerpen - 
UFSIA. 
 
de Cock, J., 1984, De Pensioenproblematiek: Elementen bij een actueel debat, 
Centrum voor Politieke, Economische en Sociale Studies (CEPESS), Brussel. 
 
Creedy, John (ed.), 1995, The Economics of Ageing, Elgar Reference Collections: 
International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, Vol. 51, Aldershot, U.K.  
 
Cowell, F., 1995, Measuring Inequality, 2
nd
 Ed., LSE handbooks in Economics, 
Prentice Hall, London. 
 
Dekkers, G., Nelissen, J., Verbon, H., 1995, Intergenerational Equity and Pension 
Reform: The Case of the Netherlands, Public Finance, vol. 50, pp. 224-245. 
 
Dekkers, G., 1998, Het Nederlandse Pensioenstelsel vanuit Belgisch Perspectief, 
Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Sociale Zekerheid, vol 40 no 1, pp 35-59. 
 
Dekkers, G., 2000, Microsimulation, in Becker, H., F. Vanclay, C. Wolf (eds), 2000, 
Conceptual and Methodological Advances in Social Impact Assessment, forthcoming. 
Chapter 5. 
 
van Eeckhoutte, W, 1998, Sociaal Zakboekje 98-1, Kluwer/Samsom.  
 
 92 
Festjens, M.-J., 1997, De Pensioenhervorming, Federaal Planbureau Planning Paper 
82, November. 
 
Harding, A., 1993, Lifetime Income Distribution and Redistribution. Applications of a 
Microsimulation Model, Contributions to Economic Analysis 221, North-Holland, 
Amsterdam. 
 
Harding, A.(ed), 1996, Microsimulation and Public Policy: selected papers from the 
IARIW Special Conference, Canberra, 5-9 December 1993, Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
 
Huijser, A., van Loo, P., 1986, Vergrijzing, Pensioenen en Contractuele Besparingen,  
Monetaire Monografieën nr 5, De Nederlandsche Bank n.v., Kluwer Deventer. 
 
Heinrich, G., 1998, Changing Times, Testing Times: a Bootstrap Analysis of Poverty 
and Inequality Using the PACO database, CERT-working paper, Heriot-Watt 
University, March 1998. 
 
Jackson, W., 1992,  Population Ageing and Intergenerational Conflict: a post-
Keynesian view,  Journal of Economic Studies, Vol. 19, no 2, pp. 26-37. 
 
Jackson, W., 1998, The Political Economy of Population Ageing, Edward Elgar  
Publishing Ltd., Cheltenham (UK), Northampton MA (US).  
 
Jansweijer, E., 1996, Gouden Bergen, Diepe Dalen: de inkomensgevolgen van een 
betaalbare oudedagsvoorziening, Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, 
Sdu Uitgevers, Den Haag 
 
Kakwani, N., 1980, Income Inequality and Poverty, Oxford University Press,  New 
York/Oxford, etc.. 
 
Kakwani, N., 1986, Analyzing Redistribution Policies: a study using Australian data. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
 93 
Kalton, G., 1983, Compensating for Missing Survey Data, Research report series, 
Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. 
 
Kingsland, L., 1982, Projecting the Financial Condition of a Pension Plan using 
Simulation Analysis, the Journal of  Finance, vol 37, p. 577-584. 
 
De Lathouwer L., (1996) Microsimulation in comparative social policy analysis: a 
case-study of unemployment schemes for Belgium and the Netherlands. - In: Harding  
(ed.), 1996, Amsterdam, Elsevier, p. 69-91. 
 
Lesthaeghe R., Meeusen, W., Vandewalle, K, 1998, Eerst Optellen, dan Delen; 
Demografie, Economie en Sociale Zekerheid, Garant Leuven/Apeldoorn. 
 
Nationaal Instituut voor de Statistiek (ministerie van Economische Zaken), 1992, 
Algemene Volks- en Woningtelling op 1 maart 1991, deel 1B: Bevolkingscijfers, NIS, 
Brussel. 
 
Belgian National Institute for Statistics and the Federal Planning Bureau, 1993, 
Bevolkingsvooruitzichten 1992-2050, Brussel. 
 
Merz, J., 1994, Microsimulation - A Survey of Methods and Applications for 
Analyzing Economic and Social Policy, Universität Lünebürg, Discussion Paper no 9, 
June 1994. 
 
Nelissen, J., 1998, Annual versus Lifetime Income Redistribution by Social Security, 
Journal of Public Economics, vol. 68, nr 2, pp. 223-250. 
 
Neyt, P., 1993, Het Belgisch Pensioenstelsel: een driepijlerstelsel? in: Ouderen in 
Solidariteit. Vlaams Welzijnscongres 1993, Kluwer Editorial pp. 353-372. 
 
Osberg, L., Xu, K., 1997, International Comparisons of Poverty Intensity: Index 
Decomposition and Bootstrap Inference, Paper presented at the 51
st
 session of the 
International Statistical Institute, Istanbul, Turkey, August 22, 1997. 
 94 
 
Proost, D., R. van Dam, K. Van den Bosch, 1996, Valideringsstudie van twee 
Belgische Inkomenssurveys, CSB-berichten D/1996/6104/07, Centrum voor Sociaal 
Beleid, Universiteit Antwerpen - UFSIA. 
 
Quinn, J., 1997, Economic Implications of an Ageing Society, Review of Income and 
Wealth, vol. 43, no 4, December 1997, pp. 511-520. 
 
Shorrocks, A., 1995, Revisiting the Sen Poverty Index, Econometrica, vol. 63, no 5, 
september 1995, pp. 1225-1230. 
 
Slesnick, D., 1998, Empirical Approaches to the measurement of Welfare, Journal of 
Economic Literature, vol. 36, nr. 4, december 1998, pp. 2108-2165. 
 
Verbist, G., Van den Bosch, K., Cantillon, B., 1999, MISIM: microsimulatiemodel 
van personenbelasting en parafiscaliteit, Centrum voort Sociaal Beleid, CSB 
berichten, D/1999/6104/04. 
 
World Bank, 1994, Averting the old-age crisis: policies to protect the old and 
promote growth, World Bank Policy Research Report, 1994:1, World Bank, 
Washington D.C. 
 
 95 
nog wat „nagekomen‟ grafieken waarvan ik me afvraag of ze er in moeten: 
proportion of age categories
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
92 95 200
0
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
year
%
age<20
20<=age<60
60<=age
 
bron: bevolk.wk4: M39 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
9
2
2
0
0
0
2
0
1
0
2
0
2
0
2
0
3
0
2
0
4
0
2
0
5
0
year
%
proportion elderly
dependency ratio
 
bron: bevolk.wk4: U9 
 
 
